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INTRODUCTION

In response to the growing internationalization of financial markets
and the internal deregulation of foreign national securities structures,'

1. Legal scholars, securities analysts and the financial press have extensively followed
the liberalization of European capital markets, especially the market in Great Britain.
The financial community's observations have focused upon whether Britain's deregulation program, the "Big Bang," will serve as a useful model for other countries, including
France, that plan to liberalize their financial markets. For an analysis of British deregu-
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the United States Government, through the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or Commission), has entertained suggestions and has
implemented measures to facilitate the flow of capital across United
States borders. 2 The world financial community has generally applauded
these actions, but has nonetheless continued the call for more reform and
liberalization of capital markets.3 The ideas behind the voices of reform
have appeal: less federal regulation means more corporate access to international capital, more opportunities for investors, and a more efficient
allocation of scarce financial resources.4
Little discussion, though, has been raised about whether the foundation of federal regulation of the United States securities market, the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act),' and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act),' will still protect the investing public if reforms
are carried through at their present pace. The Securities Act was established to prevent the reoccurrence of the stock frauds and the dangerous
price manipulations that spurred the market crash of 1929. But today,

lation efforts, see Barnard, Internationalization:The United Kingdom FinancialServices Bill-A New Regulatory Framework, in BROKER-DEALER INSTITUTE 1986: NEW
PRODUCTS, 24-HOUR TRADING, FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, MARKET INFORMATION, 530

PRAC. L. INST. (B4-6769) 9 (1986); Recent Development, InternationalTrade: Regulation of London's FinancialMarkets-The FinancialServices Act, 1986, ch. ._, 28
HARV. INT'L L.J. 196 (1987).
2. See, e.g., Kfibler, Regulatory Problems in InternationalizingTrading Markets, 9
U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 107 (1987); Merloe, Internationalizationof SecuritiesMarkets:
A CriticalSurvey of U.S. and EEC Disclosure Requirements, 8 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP.
MKT. L. 249 (1986); Thomas, ExtraterritorialApplication of the United States Securities Laws: The Need for a Balanced Policy, 7 J. CORP. L. 189 (1982); Note, SEC
Proposals to FacilitateMultinational Securities Offerings: Disclosure Requirements in
the United States and the United Kingdom, 19 N.Y.U.J. INTL' L. & POL. 457 (1987)
[hereinafter Note, SEC Proposals];Note, Barriersto the InternationalFlow of Capital:
The Facilitationof MultinationalSecurities Offerings, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 81
(1987).
3. See, e.g., Poor Stock Settlement Systems Seen Hampering InternationalStock
Trading, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 248 (Feb. 20, 1987) (roundtable of securities
industry experts, institutional investors and SEC representatives discuss reforms).
4. Thomas, supra note 2, at 190. Among the measures the SEC has taken is the
introduction of simplified filing forms for foreign corporations, Forms F-I, F-2 and F-3.
See infra notes 134-43. The SEC has also made proposals, with mixed success, for multinational securities offerings and proposals for extraterritorial enforcement of United
States securities laws. See infra notes 151-60; see also Note, SEC Proposals,supra note
2.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
6. Id. §§ 78a-kk.
7. See E. MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES ACT AND THE S.E.C.
18-25 (1948).
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the ability of each Act to combat irregularities in the domestic capital
system may be drastically reduced if a more open system of international
securities regulation is established. The evolutionary changes of United
States regulation of international capital placements could also redefine
standard concepts aimed at protecting investors, such as the "integration" doctrine: a set of guidelines used to prevent issuers from fragmenting a public offering into multiple stages so that each stage qualifies for
a registration exemption. 8 The prevention of resales of unregistered
stock, initially issued lawfully under a registration exemption to the Securities Act, could also be significantly altered if reforms are carried to
their apex.9
To further reform of the capital markets, the SEC recently issued
a series of no-action letters that held that foreign securities would not
have to be registered under the Securities Act if the stock issue met foreign government guidelines precluding resales to United States citizens.1 0

8. Integration of Securities Offerings, 1985 A.B.A. SEC. CORP. BANKING & Bus. L.
REP. 3 (Report of the Task Force on Integration, created by the Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities) [hereinafter ABA Report]. Integration of unregistered and registered stock offerings primarily concerns domestic offerings. In 1985, the American Bar
Association commissioned a task force to examine this problem in detail. The Report of
the Task Force on Integration noted the diminishing role of the integration doctrine in
general. Yet the Report concluded that subsequent court decisions and SEC rule changes
have strengthened the investor protection mechanisms of the Securities and Exchange
Acts in ways not thought of during each Act's inception. See also infra notes 183-224.
The Task Force also proposed amendment of rule 152 of the Securities Act Rules, 17
C.F.R. § 230.152 (1984), to more clearly delineate the requirements for offerings to meet
a "safe harbor" or exemption from registration. ABA Report, supra, at 67-71.
9. See infra notes 225-258 and accompanying text. Most shareholders may resell
their stocks without registering the securities under a § 4(1) Securities Act registration
exemption which allows sales of non-registered shares so long as the transaction is not by
an "issuer, underwriter or dealer." 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1) (1982). A seller, however, who is
in close connection with an issuer of unregistered securities, and who soon resells such
securities will be deemed an underwriter under § 2(11) of the Securities Act which
presumes that such a seller initially purchased the securities with a view to distribution.
15 U.S.C. § 77b (1) (1982). The Securities Act thus considers this resale process to have
been part of one unregistered stock transaction from issuer to sales customer (deemed an
underwriter by the SEC) to resale customer. See L. SODERQUIST, SECURITIES REGULATION: A PROBLEM APPROACH 266-68 (1982).
10. College Retirement Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,420, at 77,361 (Feb. 18, 1987) [hereinafter
CREF I]; French Privatization Program, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 78,439, at 77,434 (Apr. 17, 1987) [hereinafer France Letter];
see also United States: Securities and Exchange Commmission No-Action Letters Concerning French PrivatizationProgram, 36 I.L.M. 1400, 1409-21 (1987) (introductory
note by E. Galliard & W. Lee) (reprint of CREF and France Letters) [hereinafter
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These no-action letters involved a United States institutional investor
who wished to participate in a private placement of securities pursuant
to the French Government's denationalization and stock offerings of
state-owned companies. 1 The French Government also requested assurances from the SEC that its proposed program would not violate United
States laws. 2 In response, the SEC declared it would not recommend
enforcement action against the United States investor if all parties followed through with the purchase as described in the no-action requests.' 3 The SEC approval thereby allowed the United States institutional investor to participate in the accompanying private placement
component of the French Government's stock offering to French citizens
and residents.' 4
The Commission's decision by itself does not signal a revolutionary
change in international stock transactions. It is significant, however, because by carving out an additional exemption to SEC registration of foreign securities, the Commission has indicated that it will defer to the

French Privatization].
CREF sent a second no-action letter request to clarify the Commission's first answer.
College Retirement Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Req. (CCH) 78,503, at 77,612 (June 4, 1987) (hereinafter CREF II). In
this second letter, CREF wished to ascertain whether acquisition of share rights, such as
stock warrants, could be made by an American institutional investor without integration
with a public offering conducted abroad. This Note, however, will discuss only the
ramifications of the first CREF letter to the SEC, along with the no-action request sent
by the French Government.
[Ed. Note: No-action Letters not cited to a reporter service or the Federal Register
may be found through LEXIS or WESTLAW. LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file;
WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database. For the purposes of this Note, page citation to such
no-action letters will be to the pagination of the original letters currently on file with the
SEC. These letters may be obtained by contacting the SEC in Washington, D.C.]
11. The offerings in question were for such majorpFrench enterprises as Compagnie
de Saint-Gobain, Compagnie gnrale d'Electricitb, Crkdit Commercial de France and
Socith Gkn~ale. Law No. 86-793 of July 2, 1986, art. 4 annex [19861 Journal Officiel
[J.O.] 8340, Dalloz-Sirey, Lggislation [D.S.L.] 391 [hereinafter Law 86-783], reprinted
in France. Laws Concerning the Privatization of Nationalized Enterprises, 26 I.L.M.
1508, 1394 (E. Galliard & W. Lee trans. 1987) [hereinafter Nationalized Enterprises].
For a discussion detailing the rationale behind the sales and the need for French President Mitterand to obtain capital, see Berss, Move over, Margaret, FORBES, Dec. 31,
1984, at 98.
12. The French Government apparently made SEC approval a condition for participation in the offerings so that "participating underwriters and brokers are not placed at
risk under the registration provisions of the [Securities] Act." CREF I, supra note 10, at
77,362.
13. Id. at 77,363; France Letter, supra note 10, at 77,436.
14. France Letter, supra note 10, at 77,436.
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judgment of other responsible authorities in determining whether an issue contains adequate safeguards to protect investors. 15 The decision also
reflects a trend by which the SEC will not adhere to strict interpretation
of what constitutes integration of stock placements, or what requirements
are necessary to preclude the loss of a registration exemption due to possible impermissible resales of unregistered stock. Given the facts surrounding the no-action requests, the SEC's decision is surprising, considering that under the French program United States citizens resident in
France could purchase the offerings." The ruling is also unprecedented
because the SEC knew and understood that the United States institutional investors could resell their privately-placed shares on the Paris
Bourse: 7 the Commission must have understood that such sales, at least
in theory, could place the shares with unsophisticated United States public investors."'
This Note will explore the possibilities of future international securities offerings in the United States in light of the SEC's answers to the
no-action requests of the United States institutional investor, College Retirement Equities Fund, and of the French Government (CREF-France
Letters). The Note will also review the Letters' foreseeable effects on
traditional securities law concepts such as integration, and the "coming
to rest" doctrine on resales of foreign-issued securities as well as analyze
the decision's ramifications on United States securities law enforcement.
Moreover, the Note will review the French privatization program and
how the unusual nature of this program may have influenced the SEC's

15. FrenchPrivatization,supra note 10, at 1408. "It is also our view that additional
procedures would not be required in the foreign offerings as a result of the concurrent
U.S. offerings." France Letter, supra note 10, at 77,436 (reply of SEC). Essentially the
SEC relied on the safeguards of French law by granting the no-action letter. Some experts have held that the decision signals a more territorial approach to securities enforcement. French Privationization,supra note 10, at 1408; see also Chubb & Kelly, SEC
No-Action Letter Relaxes Market, INT'L FINANCIAL L. Rv., Apr. 1987, at 21.
16. Law No. 86-912 of August 6, 1986, art. 13, [1986] J.O. 9695-97, 1986 D.S.L.
431 [hereinafter Law 86-912], reprinted in Nationalized Enterprises, supra note 11, at
1395, 1403.
17. Despite the promise of resale limits similar to those in Securities Act rule 144, 17
C.F.R. § 230.144 (1988), the distribution plan stated: "Each investor will agree not to
make any reoffers or resales... unless... [such sale can be] made on the Paris Bourse
in regular way transactions ... ." France Letter, supra note 10, at 77,435.
18. No clear definition of "sophisticated" investor exists under the Securities Act per
se. Rule 506 of regulation D of the Securities Act Rules, however, alludes to a definition
of "sophistication": sales are permissible to those who have "such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that [such persons are] capable of evaluating the
merits and risks of the prospective investment." 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1988).
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decision. This latter purpose assumes importance because only through
an understanding of the French program can securities specialists realize
the full implication of the SEC rulings and plan for clients who deal in
international securities offerings in order to meet SEC requirements."9
II.

SITUATION STUDY: SEC APPROVAL OF PLACEMENT OF FRENCH
PRIVATIZED SECURITIES

A.

Elements of the French PrivatizationProgram

To meet a budgetary crisis and to stimulate the French economy, ° the
French Government commenced in mid-1986 a major denationalization
of leading industrial companies and financial institutions in which the
Government owned a controlling interest."1 The privatization reflected a
radical shift in French economic policy since many of the sixty-five firms
to undergo privatization were nationalized by the Government only four
years earlier, soon after the election of socialist President Frangois Mitterand. 22 The law promulgating the denationalization program, Law
No. 86-793 of July 2, 1986, resembled a resolution instead of a fullfledged planning program: the law merely encouraged the French Government to formulate policy and guidelines to effect denationalization.2"
Law 86-793 centers around two major provisions. Article 4 delineates
the companies to be placed in the denationalization program by the Government."u The world financial community had considerable interest in
19. Privatization measures in the United States have been limited to sectors, such as
prisons, which traditionally the government managed. See, e.g., Savas, Privatizations
and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REv. 889 (1987). Yet the issue of privatization is important
for securities specialists, especially for those dealing with foreign countries that have a
long history of government-run operations in areas normally sponsored by the private
sector. See, e.g., MacKenzie, On the Road to Privatization:Mining and Airlines, MID.
E. EXEC. REP., Sept. 1985, at 21 (Turkish denationalization efforts); see also supra note
1.
20. See Berss, supra note 11. Declining capital rates, and the need to spur the
French industrial sector were the main reasons for the privatizations.
21. See Law 86-793, supra note 11.
22. Law No. 82-155 of Feb. 11, 1982 [1982] J.O. 566, 1982 D.S.L. 921, reprinted
in France:Law of Nationalization,21 I.L.M. 815 (P. Anderegg trans. 1982). For background on the nationalization program and the mixed progress it achieved, see Jacquillat, Nationalization and Privatizationin ContemporaryFrance,8 GOV'T UNION REV.
21 (1987). See generally Loyrette & Gaillot, The French Nationalizations:The Decision
of the French ConstitutionalCouncil and Their Aftermath, 17 Gao. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 17 (1982); Note, The TerritorialException to the Act of State Doctrine:Application to French Nationalization,6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 121 (1982).
23. Law 86-793, supra note 11, art. 4.
24. Id.
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several of the listed companies, which included some of the premier financial houses in France.25 The second main provision, article 7-I, requires that participating companies must have at least fifty percent Government ownership, or that they must have been previously nationalized
under the Mitterand Administration's earlier decree.2
Other provisions of the law provide a foundation for the privatization
program. Article 5 establishes guidelines to determine the offering price
of each enterprise, the legal and financial means of transfer, and the
conditions of payment.2 7 Article 5 also has special importance for international securities holders because the provision mandates procedures for
the development of public shareholding and for the protection of the national public interest.2 Because of, or perhaps despite, this directive, the
subsequent privatization measure, Law No. 86-912 of August 6, 1986
(Law 86-912), expressly allowed non-French citizens resident in France
to acquire the denationalized securities. 9
Law 86-912 specifically states, "The requests of individuals of French
nationality, or [of those] resident in France, which do not exceed 10
shares are to be fully respected.""0 Although this statement does not
squarely endorse unrestricted sales to United States citizens or corporations, the statement belies the Law's orientation towards wide customer
distribution. Other points exemplifying the philosophy of Law 86-912
include the provisions for discounting of shares, 3 ' payment extensions, 2
and gratuitous distribution of shares33 up to fifty shares per individual or
up to a value of less than 25,000 French Francs. Other aspects of Law
86-912 emphasize its goal of facilitating sales to a wide range of small
French investors. Articles 11 and 12 direct the Government to offer holdings to salaried employees of the denationalized companies and such
firms' subsidiaries, if such employees have attained five years seniority at

25. Rossant, Come One, Come All to the Great French Sell-Off, Bus. WK., Sept. 22,
1986, at 46. Speculation existed that many European companies and financial "raiders"
showed considerable interest in the program. Id. In addition, financial analysts considered the privatized stocks among the more promising issues in Europe. Id.
26. Law 86-793, supra note 11, art. 7-I.
27. Id. art. 5.
28. Id.
29. Law 86-912, supra note 16, art. 13.
30. Id.
31. Id. art. 11.
32.

Id.

33. Id. arts. 12-13.
34. Id. art. 13.
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their company.3 5 Law 86-912 does not require employees to purchase
their shares directly from the Government; shares may be transferred to
the privatized corporation which then has one year to resell the shares to
eligible employees.3
Coupled with these articles are provisions that limit foreign purchases
to twenty percent of an enterprise. The Ministry of the Economy retains
the power to lower the limit on foreign purchases if such measures are in
the national interest. 7 This latter provision reflects another feature of
Law 86-912: the limitation of large holdings. For example, if an enterprise conducts business pursuant to articles 55, 56 and 223 of the European Economic Community, the Ministry of the Economy must review
requests for holdings exceeding five percent. 8 EEC law considers firms
subject to these articles as corporations performing services in the individual state's national interest; therefore, despite EEC guidelines favoring unfettered access to capital, EEC law defers to the member state's
regulation of such industries."' Certain "extraordinary shares," issued by
the Ministry, provide the only exception to the limit on shareholding:
through these shares, single entities or groups may control over ten percent of the capital of a corporation.4 °
Despite the laws' slant toward protection and encouragement of small,
public purchasers, the privatization program has been only partially successful in attaining some of its goals. As a result of the program, about
five to six million residents hold stocks of denationalized firms,"' thus

35. Id. arts. 11-12.
36. Id. art. 11.
37. Id. art. 10. An exception to the trend toward exclusion of secondary buyers was
the offering of Compagnie gnrale d'Electricit6, which held a combined equity and second offering. Jacquillat, supra note 22, at 43.
38. Law 86-912, supra note 16, art. 10.
39. Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, arts. 55, 56, 223, 298 U.N.T.S. 3. Articles 55
and 56, part of chapter 2 of the Treaty, guarantee that the Community and its members
will not interfere with the right of "establishment." This right includes ownership of
stock. Treaty of Rome, art. 54. Exceptions to chapter 2, however, deal with actions of
official authority-acts of the Member States themselves that concern purely internal
matters. For example, article 55 provides: "Activities which in any State include, even
incidentially, the exercise of public authority shall, in so far as that State is concerned, be
excluded from the application of the provisions of this Chapter." 298 U.N.T.S. at 39.
Because of the official connection between some of the privatization firms and the
French Government, the requirement of French ministerial approval for securities sales
of these corporations is understandable.
40. Law 86-912, supra note 16, art. 10. Such shares may be converted into common
stock for up to five years.
41. French Flock to Buy Stocks, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1987, at 37, col. 3.
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absorbing about $30-40 billion into the French capital market.4 2 Experts
have concluded, however, that the French Government vastly undervalued the privatized issues. For example, nonvoting shares of SaintGobain, a major packing company, resold on the French stock exchange
at twenty times their 1986 per share earnings,43 thus driving out secondary buyers."' Considering that Law 86-912 called for the objective valuation of denationalized corporations, 4 5 it seems that in this respect the
program failed.
B.

French Securities Law

The French stock system today combines established traditions with
modern Wall Street procedures. This amalgam's goal is to make France
one of the leaders in twenty-first century capital markets. And while the
privatization program serves as a means of measuring French progress in
the area of capital market reform, it remains to be seen whether France
can continue to successfully graft new ideas onto the stock system's foundation. For example, despite the liberalization measures undertaken elsewhere in Europe with regard to stockbrokers,) 6 French stock dealers still
enjoy a monopoly on the stock exchange.' 7 Unlike Wall Street, the
French financial community considers brokers to be members of a venerable profession, not only because of the work brokers do, but also because the State appoints brokers to the Bourse.48 As a result, France sees
brokers as holders of public office.' 9 In addition to their regular duties,
brokers, also known as agents de change, have the legal power to suspend trading, to officially define controlling interests in a firm, and to
recommend that firms be admitted to the Bourse.5 °

42.
43.
44.
stocks
45.

Rossant, supra note 25, at 46.
Id.
CREF's application for the no-action letter contended the rise in price of such
was a reason for the exemption. CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,362.
Law 86-912, supra note 16, art. 3.

46. See, e.g., Grass, Internationalization of the Securities Trading Markets, 9
Hous. J. INT'L L. 17, 24-27 (1986) (changing duties of British stockbrokers following
the Big Bang).
47. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. 76 (83 ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1987-88); see
also 2 SIMPON MoQuET BORDE & Associgs, DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE §
15.04[2][C] (1988) [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS].
48. C. coM. art. 74; see also Mazet, Foreign Investments in French Listed Equity in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS Wr
FRANCE, 407 PRAC. L. INST. (A4-4176)

27, 39 (1987).
49.
50.

Mazet, supra note 48, at 39.
Id. at 39-40. See generally Grass, supra note 46, at 27-30.
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In contrast to the wide powers of brokers, the Commission des Opbrations de Bourse (COB), established in 1967,5' supervises only limited
functions. The Board is comprised of a president appointed by the Council of Ministers, and four members chosen by the Ministry of the Economy. 2 Although the COB operates under the Ministry of Finance and
has a managerial status over the stock brokers association, the Compagnie des Agents de Change, the brokers and their association have
greater control, in that the association has extensive authority over trading. 3 The COB, however, in addition to reviewing issuer prospectuses,"
has power to promulgate regulations on the procedural functioning of
the stock market and thus may approve an issuer's listing on the stock
exchange. 5 More important, however, unlike in the United States where
the SEC has the authority to interrupt stock price quotations, French
law vests such power in the Chambre Syndicale (the Chamber), the

51. Ordinance No. 67-833 of Sept. 28, 1967, [1967] J.O. 9589, 1967 D.S.L. 373
[hereinafter Ordinance 67-833]; see also 2 DOING BUSINESS, supra note 47, at §
15.04[2][b]; Mazet, supra note 48, at 38-39.
52. Ordinance 67-833, supra note 51, art. 2; see also 2 DOING BUSINESS, supra note
47, § 15.04[2][b].
53. See Mazet, supra note 48, at 39-40.
54. Ordinance 67-833, supra note 51, art. 3(2). A prospectus must set forth the
following:
1. all relevant facts concerning the transactions in question.
2. general information concerning the issuer, such as its name, juridical form, corporate purpose, registered capital, activities, etc.,
3. a description of the principal activities of the issuer, including, without limitation, information on its turnover, employees, subsidiaries, etc.,
4. certain financial information, including, without limitation, the issuer's balance
sheets, profit and loss statements and consolidated accounts for the last three fiscal
years as well as certain other information relating to its last five fiscal years,
5. the names of the members of the issuer's management and controlling shareholders, as well as the nature of their relationships with it,
6. a brief summary of the recent evolution of the business of the issuer and of its
prospects for the future,
7. the motivation for the public offering and the use to which the proceeds thereof
are to be put, and
8. the names of the persons or legal entities responsible for disseminating the prospectus and, where appropriate, information concerning the bank or other credit
establishment which guarantees the placement of the securities constituting the
public offering (garante du placement).
Instruction of February 2, 1982 of the Commission des Opgrationsde Bourse Relating to
Prospectuses by Companies Making Public Offerings, ch. I, § Annex I (Pub. Commission des Opirations de Bourse 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Instruction]; 2 DOING BUSINESS,
supra note 47, § 15.04[3][b] n.45, 52.
55. 2 DOING BUSINESS, supra note 47, § 15.04[2][a].
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managing group of the stockbrokers association, not the COB.5 6 Yet despite the differences between the COB and the SEC, to which the COB
has suffered in comparison because of the variance of duties and powers,57 the COB remains the main investigatory body for insider trading
violations. In addition, France recently expanded the COB's power to
intervene in publicly traded companies to ensure greater financial
accountability.5"
According to article 4 of Law 86-912, issuance of the privatized stocks
was to take place using procedures prescribed by Paris Stock Exchange.5 9 This, in turn, entailed use of a public offering method known
as Offres Publiques de Vente (OPV). 60 For an issue to meet OPV requirements, the amount of shares issued must conform with minimum
registered capital and value levels."' Because the privatization encompassed a total divestment of major sectors of the French economy, the
OPV measures caused large amounts of potential capital ownership to
flow into the hands of the average French resident or citizen.6 2 In addition, to qualify as an OPV, an issue must meet certain minimum share
requirements, namely that the stock represents:
1.at least 10 percent of the registered capital of the issuer and be valued at
at least five million Francs, [or]
2. at least 5 percent of the registered capital of the issuer and be valued at
at least ten million Francs, or
3. a quantity of shares equal to at least twenty times the average daily

56. R~glement Gtnral de la Compagnie des Agents de Change, art. 109, approved
by Arr& of Aug. 8, 1973, [1973] J.O. 9175, 1973 D.S.L. 354, amended by Decree No.
83-360 of May 2, 1983, [1983] J.O. 1361, 1983 D.S.L. 233, Arr&t6 of Oct. 18, 1983,
[1983] J.O. 9561, 1983 D.S.L. 503, Arrt6 of Oct. 15, 1985, [1985] J.O. 12259, 1985
D.S.L. 558, Arr~t of Mar. 11, 1986, [1986] J.O. 3848, 1986 D.S.L. 283, Arrt6 of June
19, 1986, [1986] J.O. 7640, 1986 D.S.L. 389 [hereinafter Rtglement Gtnral]; see also 2
DOING BUSINESS, supra note 47, § 15.04[2][b] fn. 7.
57. Grass, supra note 46, at 29.
58. Law No. 84-148 of March 1, 1984, [1984] J.O. 751, 1984 D.S.L. 222; see also
Quintin, French CorporateLaw and the Choice of a Corporate Entity, in LEGAL AsPECTS oF DOING BUSINESS WITH FRANCE, 407 PRAC. L. INsT.

(A4-4176) 105, 137-38

(1987).
59. Law 86-912, supra note 16, art. 4.
60. 2 DOING BUSINESS, supra note 47, § 15.04[4][c].
61. R~glement G~nral, supra note 56, art. 209-1.
62. See French Flock, supra note 41. Presently 9.5 million French citizens-one of
six in the entire country-own stock in French companies. Of this figure, about twothirds purchased stock through the privatization program. Id. Ironically, French politicians and the press have faulted the government for undervaluing the stocks. See, e.g.,
Primitive Privatizations,ECONOMIST, June 27, 1987, at 17.
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volume of the shares of the issuer traded during the six months preceding
the OPV."
French procedures for establishing public offerings are relatively
straightforward. First, all shares outstanding must have been paid in to
the company before a new issue may commence." In addition, the issuing corporation must hold a special meeting of the stockholders, a quorum of which must approve the issuance of the new stock. 5 This step is
important because French law allows such stockholders to exercise preferential rights.66 After shareholder approval occurs, the company must
file specified reports with the stockbrokers association and with the
COB.67 Within the file to the Chamber, the corporation must list the
basic parameters of the transaction including the number of shares to be
sold and the objectives of the transaction.6 If the Chamber approves the
measures of the applicant company, the Chamber will publish public
notice of its approval.6 9 Simultaneously, the COB reviews the file, particularly the prospectus, to ensure that the corporation has submitted accurate information concerning the following: facts underlying the stock
placement; normal information concerning the issuer; registered capital
and corporate purpose;70 profit and loss information over the past three
years; names of the members of the issuer's management and shareholders; a brief summary of the evolution of the business; reasons supporting
the public offering; and information on the underwriters who will back
the issuer in the securities placement. 1

63. R~glement Ginral, supra note 56, art. 209-1, reprinted in 2 DOING BUSINESS,
supra note 47, § 15.04[4][c].
64. Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 6402, 1966 D.S.L. 265, art. 38,
amended by Law No. 82-596 of July 10, 1982 [19821 J.0. 2204, 1982 D.S.L. 323 [hereinafter Law 66-537]. For a translation of the preamended laws, see FRENCH LAW ON
COMMERCIAL COMPANIES 33 (CCH 1971). For a more detailed outline of the French

public offering procedure, see 2 DOING BUSINESS, supra note 47, § 15.04. See also
Quintin, supra note 58, at 142.
65. Law 66-537, supra note 64, art. 180.
66. Id. art. 183, amended by Law No. 85-1321 of Dec. 14, 1985, [1985] J.O. 14595,
1986 D.S.L. 43.

67.

Law 66-537, supra note 64, art. 74.
R~glement G~n~ral, supra note 56, art. 209-2(1); see also 2 DOING BUSINESS,
supra note 47, § 15.04[4][c].
69. Rtglement G~nral, supra note 56, art. 209-4; 2 DOING BUSINESS, supra note
68.

47, § 15.04[4][c].

70. Most of this information is available to the public when the company initially
registers itself pursuant to French law. Law 66-537, supra note 64, § II (Organization
of Corporations).

71.

1982 Instruction, supra note 54.
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French underwriters play a role in stock transactions different from
that of their United States counterparts. All issuers, even those registrants who do not list themselves on the Bourse, must have a transfer
agent. 72 The purpose of this requirement is to free issuer company personnel from performing transfer agent tasks." French underwriters continually supervise all aspects of the issuance, from payment of coupons,
to the distribution of stock dividends long after placement. 4 Moreover,
an underwriter normally may purchase all or part of its client's issue,
even if the underwriting firm plans to redistribute the stocks to its own
customers. 5 Program underwriters for the privatization, however, cannot exercise this option because Government policy goals mandate distribution to ordinary citizens.7
Some similarities do exist between United States and French underwriting. Under both systems, underwriters may act as intermediaries between market customers and the issuer, and may offer new securities to
their customers.77 Also, as in the United States, underwriters in France
may contract with the issuer to guarantee that the entire issuance will be
purchased. If the issue is not completely sold, the underwriters will
purchase the remaining securities themselves.7
C.

Elements of the SEC Approval

Because the French Privatization program released millions of dollars
worth of stock, and because such securities included those of highly
respected banking, insurance, credit and public utility companies,
United States institutional investors expressed interest in obtaining holdings of subsequent issues. Based on this interest, College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), the manager of a $28 billion ERISA fund, $3 billion of which is in foreign securities, 0 approached French authorities,
seeking to participate in the international private placement undertaken
72. See Mazet, supra note 48, at 44-47.
73. Id.
74. 2 DOING BUSINESS, supra note 47, § 15.03[10][a].
75. The French call this process priseferme. Id.
76. Law 86-912, supra note 16, arts. 11-13.
77. Compare 2 DOING BUSINESS, supra note 47, § 15.03[10][a], with L. SODERQUIST, supra note 9, at 35-37.
78. 2 DOING BUSINESS, supra note 47, § 15.02[10][a]. Id. French law states that
plans to increase capital must be completed within five years. Law 66-537, supra note
64, art. 181, amended by Law. No. 83-1, of Jan. 3, 1983, [1983] J.O. 162, 1983 D.S.L.
89.
79. Law 86-793, supra note 11, art. 4 Annex.
80. CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,361.
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concurrently with the public offering."1 French officials supervising the
program indicated that they would allow CREF participation in the offering "provided that, in so doing, the French Government and participating underwriters and brokers [were] not placed at risk under the registration provisions of the 1933 Act."" Incidentally, CREF held securities of French issuers valued at over $160 million, most of which
CREF maintained in France thus bolstering CREF's standing with the
83
French Government.
In order to obtain French administrative approval to be a recipient of
the privately placed securities,' CREF, through counsel, petitioned the
SEC for a no-action letter.8 5 CREF based its request on three grounds.
First, CREF argued that current SEC restrictions on unregistered foreign offerings unnecessarily hampered CREF's strategy of long-term securities investment and that because of these restrictions, 8 CREF could
not participate in the French program.17 CREF's second argument was
more persuasive. Because of stringent United States securities law restrictions, responsible issuers such as France had been continually wary
of including United States participation in any private stock placement.
The previous privatizations, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain and Compagnie financi~re de Paribas, quickly sold out at the initial offering price
and soon rose in value on the secondary market.88 United States institutional investors such as CREF could make purchases on the secondary
market, but such acquisitions could be made only at a less favorable

81. Law 86-793, supra note 11, arts. 11, 13.
82. CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,362.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 77,361.
85. To obtain a no-action letter, counsel for the applicant corporation outlines the
proposed transaction to the chief counsel of the particular operating division administering the regulation for which the exemption is sought. The Chief Counsel for the Division
of Corporation Finance handles applications for no-action requests addressing Securities
or Exchange Act questions. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 Bus. LAW.
1019, 1024 (1987). Usually, the SEC grants letters freely so long as the issuer meets the
relevant securities rules and laws. While no-action letters do not have the force of law, in
practice, recipients of such letters may rely on them with confidence. L. SODERQUIST,
supra note 9, at 22.
Although counsel for a particular division of the SEC grants a no-action request, this
Note will refer to answers by the Chief Counsel of the Division of Corporation Finance
as answers by the SEC in general.
86. CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,362.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also supra note 62.
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priceY9 Therefore, since United States securities laws made foreign issuers hesitant and since CREF could eventually purchase the shares, the
only effect the SEC's rules had was to make purchases of foreign-issued
securities more expensive than they otherwise would have been.90
CREF's third argument charged that this "prejudicial effect" was not an
intended aim of the applicable United States securities laws'
Legal counsel for CREF supported their contentions by finally arguing that under section 4(2) of the Securities Act,92 CREF qualified as a
sophisticated investor; thus, France, as an issuer, would not have to register the privatized offerings.9 If one accepted this argument, it logically
followed that French officials and participating underwriters did not
have to face the possibility of sanctions for falling to register such an
offering with the SEC.94 CREF also contended that the factors behind
the offering made the grant of a registration exemption particularly compelling. No public market in the United States existed for the French
securities; agreements would be concluded among issuers, dealers and
underwriters to ensure that the securities would not be sold to United
States nationals; and CREF would send out warrants to the SEC and to
potential resale customers that CREF was purchasing such stocks for
investment purposes and would not knowingly resell the stock to United
States investors.95
On the other end of the transaction, the French Government, through
the French branch of a United States law firm,9" contacted the SEC to
request assurances that the Division of Corporation Finance would not

89. CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,362.
90. Id.
91. Id. From the Securities Act's inception, legal commentators have noted the inherent tension in the Act between "giving maximum protection to investors [and] minimum
interference to business." Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43
YALE L.J. 171, 173 (1933).
92. Section 4(2) provides an exemption for transactions that are not public offerings.
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
93. CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,362.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 77,362-63. A possible exemption could also exist under section 4(6) of the
Securities Act for "sales by an issuer solely to one or more accredited investors." 15
U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1982). However, the maximum limit for such an exemption is $5 million, presumably too low a figure for the French privatizations. Id. § 77c(b).
96. Foreign issuers seeking a no-action letter typically use United States law firms
that either have offices located in the issuer's home country or possess strong securities
law experience. For example, CREF employed the New York-based firm of Debevoise
& Plimpton and the French Government used the Paris branch of Shearman & Sterling.
French Privatization,supra note 10, at 1410, 1417.
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recommend enforcement action if the privatization program proceeded as
planned.9 7 The Government asked specifically whether the private placements to United States institutional investors would be integrated with
the public offering. 8 The French Government's letter outlined the OPV
procedure for public offerings and highlighted the categories of stock
subscriptions available: Category "A" allowed for a purchase of up to
ten shares by French citizens and foreign citizens resident in France, and
Category "B" allowed for additional purchases of stock by French citizens and foreign resident nationals residing in France.9"
Because the French Government developed the privatization program
to encourage wide distribution of shares, the Government was concerned
that its institutional placement would be integrated with the public offering, thus eliminating the private placement exemption of section 4(2) of
the Securities Act. 10° French authorities, on their own initiative, and perhaps with an eye toward settling some uncertainties evolving from the
answer to the CREF no-action letter,' 0 ' proposed to structure the international private placement offering with additional restrictions. Such
measures included notices to offerees stating that the Securities Act
would not cover the privately-placed securities, and that such securities
could not be resold in the United States or to United States citizens.0 2 In
addition, France promised to conclude agreements with underwriters forbidding sales to United States citizens and that advisory statements
would be sent to dealers in the private placement warning of the United
States selling restrictions.'
To bolster its argument that United States institutional investors
should be included in the private placement, France contended to the
SEC that section 4 of the Securities Act created an exemption allowing a
private placement without registration.'" Under this exemption, private

97. France Letter, supra note 10, at 77,434.
98. Id. at 77,435.
99. Id. OPV laws provide another procedure for stock purchases, Category "C,"
which is available only to French entities not under foreign control.
100. See supra note 92.
101. See supra note 10. Even though CREF II did not mention the French privatization program, one could assume the SEC's first no-action letter left some questions open.
By the nature of the letter, it may be assumed that CREF was concerned about whether
American institutional investors could do more than merely purchase stocks in a foreign
offering. Hence, the question posed in the second letter centered on whether American
institutional investors could obtain and exercise stock warrants of foreign-issued shares.
CREF II, supra note 10, at 77,612.
102. France Letter, supra note 10, at 77,435.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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offerees could not make offers or resales unless another Securities Act
exemption applied. Therefore, because of these restrictions, it was unnecessary for the United States to deny an exemption because no practicable way existed for the United States institutional investors to resell
the stock. 0 5 An interesting facet of the the French proposal was that
despite the French Government's reliance on established Securities Act
registration exemptions, no such exemption covered the "regular way,"
i.e. standard, Bourse transactions that Law 86-912 of the denationalization program allowed. 1 6 SEC approval of the French request seems unusual because under a French "regular way" transaction, no requirement exists that an investigation be held to determine the nationality of
the buyer.1 07 Therefore it appears that despite any guidelines the French
Government and CREF agreed to place on the offerings, a party could
resell the securities on the Bourse without having a duty to inquire
whether the purchaser was a United States citizen.
The CREF and the French Government requests resulted in no-action
statements holding that the securities would not have to be registered
under the Securities Act' 08 and that OPV measures were adequate to
preclude integration of the public and private offerings.10 9 Both sets of
letters, though, raise interesting points that relate to the application of
United States securities laws to foreign issuers. First, the SEC staff accepted the argument that certain procedures used to ensure prevention of
resales to United States investors were not necessary. Because of the
close relationship between the parties to the underwriting, the SEC accepted CREF's assertion that the use of either temporary share certificates or the employment of legends on share certificates forbidding resales was unnecessary." 0
Second, and more important, the CREF no-action letter emphasizes
that through Securities Act Release No. 4708"' (an interpretative release which holds that foreign offerings by United States issuers need not
be registered with the Commission) a foreign public offering combined

105. Id.
106. Law 86-912, supra note 16, art. 4.
107. France Letter, supra note 10, at 77,435.
108. CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,363 (response to CREF by SEC Chief Counsel,
Division of Corporation Finance).
109. France Letter, supra note 10, at 77,436 (response to French Government by
SEC Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance).
110. CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,363.
111. Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers; Registration of Underwriters of Foreign Offerings by Broker-Dealers, Securities Act Release No. 4708, 29
Fed. Reg. 9828 (July 22, 1964) [hereinafter Release 33-47081.
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with a United States private placement should not require registration." 2 The CREF no-action request pointed out that while Release 334708 deals with United States issuers, the spirit of the Release still applies if a foreign issuer makes a non-United States public and a United
States private offering. 1 3 If the SEC continues to approve the non-registration of such offerings, based on its decision in the CREF-France Letters, foreign issuers will have greater opportunities for access to United
States markets without concern about SEC intervention. The decision in
the CREF-France Letters has thus removed one of the major obstacles
that foreign issuers have encountered in obtaining United States capital.
Even if the SEC's decision is narrowly interpreted, future issuers with a
strong connection to a trustworthy government may encounter little resistance in making stock placements with large, sophisticated institutional
investors.
Several negative aspects to the letters, though, exist. Despite the SEC's
holding that the French plan will not result in an integrated stock offering, the lack of resale constraints could pose problems. The French Government's no-action request mentioned the possibility of resales of the
privately-placed securities on the Paris Bourse in "regular way" transactions, which seems to circumvent the precautions that CREF and the
French Government argued they would undertake in order to prevent
resales to United States citizens.11 In addition, the letter from the
French Government indicates few precautions were established to protect
United States citizens who are eligible to purchase the privatized stock
because of their legal status as French nationals." 5 Because of this last
loophole, a situation could easily arise in which a French resident, who
is also a United States citizen, could purchase unregistered stock. If
problems arose concerning these transactions, the question would ensue
of whether United States securities fraud laws would apply to the
purchase in question.
In granting registration exemptions to CREF and to France, the SEC
opened the door for greater flexibility in foreign-issued share distributions, the benefits of which will help nations with sophisticated financial
structures. Yet by giving blanket approval to the proposals, the SEC may
have failed to ensure that investors are properly protected if difficulties

112. Id.; see also OREF I, supra note 10, at 77,363.
113. France Letter, supra note 10, at 77,435.
114. Id. at 77,434-35.
115. France deems individuals of foreign nationality who have established habitual
residence in France as legal residents. Arr&tt of August 9, 1973, art. 3 [1973] J.O. 8701,
1973 D.S.L. 345. See generally 1 DOING BUSINESS, supra note 47, § 3.02[1][b].
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develop with such offerings. Only through an analysis of the SEC's decision as it applies to the traditional measures of securities regulation, will
the full impact of the Commission's decision become clear.
III.

INTERNATIONAL STOCK OFFERINGS INVOLVING THE UNITED
STATES

In order to glean the rationale behind the SEC's no-action assurances
to CREF and the French Government, Commission attitudes towards
international securities offerings, and the application of United States
securities laws to such offerings, must be explored. Initially the Securities Act and the Exchange Act seem to apply to foreign investors and
issuers so long as the transaction peripherally involves the United States
or its citizens. The Securities Act states that interstate commerce includes
"transportation or communications relating thereto among the several
States

. .

.or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or

the District of Columbia.""1 6 The Exchange Act further states that
means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce cannot be used to defraud, manipulate or to carry out contrivances that contradict SEC
rules.117 From reading the rules in conjunction with each other, some
securities law experts have argued that the Acts are applicable in their
entirety to international securities transactions that affect, in some manner, the United States.1 1
While various United States judicial decisions have limited this philosophy," 9 the nature of international securities markets has also served to
prevent a stringent interpretation of the Acts. First of all, it is procedurally difficult for foreign companies to follow United States guidelines,
especially in light of differing foreign accounting and financial standards.120 Other points countering the idea of strict enforcement include
economic costs: if meeting SEC guidelines becomes too expensive, foreign

116. Securities Act § 2(7), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(7) (1982).
117. Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
118. See, e.g., Larose, Conflicts, Contacts and Cooperation:ExtraterritorialApplication of the United States Securities Laws, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 99, 101-02 (1984).
Through the "conduct" and "effects" tests, United States courts have effectively reduced
the likelihood that the SEC will bring suits against foreign entities for violation of the
Securities and Exchange Acts. See also Comment, ExtraterrtorialApplication of United
States Commodity and Securities Laws to Market Transactions in an Age of Intercontinental Trading Links, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 351, 362-67 (1985).
119. Larose, supra note 118, at 101-02; see also infra notes 287-307 and accompanying text.
120. Lorenz, EEC Law and Other Problems in Applying the SEC Proposal on Multinational Offerings to the U.K., 21 INT'L LAw. 795, 796 (1987).
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issuers will be less inclined to seek investment opportunities in the
United States. 2 ' Secondary arguments include the propositions that
stringent SEC behavior unnecessarily hampers the free flow of capital, 2'
and that general barriers on the trading of securities has a deleterious
effect on United States economic foreign policy. 2 In addition to these
somewhat abstract economic arguments, a few real world practicalities
have prevented the SEC from having a wider role in policing international placements.
The United States judiciary has set up major limitations by reducing
the territorial scope of United States securities laws. In Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook,24 a United States shareholder of Banff Oil, a Canadian corporation, brought a derivative suit alleging that Banff directors, among
others, forced Banff to sell its treasury shares at a market price the defendants knew, from inside information, did not represent the true value
of such shares. The court's analysis focused on the American citizenship
of some of the parties involved, even though all transactions occurred in
Canada. The court held that "Congress intended the Exchange Act to
have extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors
who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges, and to
protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in United States securities."'12 5 Despite affirming the
grant of summary judgment for the defendant, the court found that Exchange Act review did not exclude foreign transactions per se. 2 6 As a
121. Thomas, Internationalizationof the Securities Markets: An Empirical Analysis, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 155, 158 (1982).
122. Id. at 158.
123. Id.
124. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), affd in part, rev'd in part, 405 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); see also Larose, supra note 118,
at 103-04; Comment, supra note 118, at 362-65.
125. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206 (emphasis added). The court stated:
We find that the language and [the] purpose of § 30(b) show that it was not
meant to exempt transactions that are conducted outside the jurisdiction of the
United States unless they are part of a "business in securities." Indeed, since Congress found it necessary to draft an exemptive provision for certain foreign transactions and gave the Commission power to make rules that would limit this exemption, the presumption must be that the Act was meant to apply to those foreign
transactions not specifically exempted.
Id. at 208.
126. Id. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment partly on the ground
that, despite valid subject matter jurisdiction, the defendants' conduct did not give rise to
a cause of action under rule 10b-5 or under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Id. at
212-214. Later, the Second Circuit, en banc, reversed the lower court and held that the
plaintiff's claim was cognizable under rule 1Ob-5. Therefore, summary judgment in favor
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result the decision did set guidelines as to the applicability of United
States securities laws in policing fraudulent conduct that has effects in
this country.
Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment Corp. v. Maxwell1 2 7 subsequently
reduced the scope of the Schoenbaum effects test. In Leasco, a foreign
defendant allegedly caused a United States firm and other plaintiffs to
purchase shares of a British company at an inflated price on the London
Stock Exchange. The Second Circuit distinguished the facts of Leasco
from Schoenbaum noting that the United States company purchased
shares on a reputable exchange. 12 8 Because of this factor, the court believed that to enter judgment for the plaintiff on the basis of the plaintiff's United States nationality stretched the meaning of the effects test
too far.' 29 The court instead focused on the legislative intent behind the
Securities and Exchange Acts, holding that Congress enacted the rules so
as to prevent fraudulent conduct within the United States. 3 ° As a result
of this case, the "conduct" test has been the other major barometer by
which United States courts have measured fraud in international securities dealings.
The SEC actively encourages registration of foreign stock issues, in
part because of judicial limitations upon the extraterritorial enforcement
of the securities laws. Yet, pressures toward liberalization stemming
from the internationalization of capital markets have had some effect on
the Commission. Therefore, to facilitate registration, the SEC in 1982
of the defendants, except for one corporate party, was improper. 405 F.2d 215, 219-220.
127. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Larose, supra note 118, at 104-05;
Comment, supra note 118, at 365-67.
128. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1332.

129. Id. at 1334.
130. Id. at 1336-37.
Our case, however, is not the simple one thus hypothesized. In that instance not
only the fraudulent misrepresentation but the issuance of the check and the receipt
of the securities occurred in the United States, although the check was deposited
and the security mailed in Canada. Here it was understood from the outset that all
the transactions would be executed in England. Still we must ask ourselves
whether, if Congress had thought about the point, it would not have wished to
protect an American investor if a foreigner comes to the United States and fraudulently induces him to purchase foreign securities abroad-a purpose which its
words can fairly be held to embrace. While, as earlier stated, we doubt that impact
on an American company and its shareholders would suffice to make the statute
applicable if the misconduct had occurred solely in England, we think it tips the
scales in favor of applicability when substantial misrepresentations were made in
the United States.
Id. at 1337. For a throrough analysis of the "conduct" and "effects" tests, see Larose,
supra note 118, at 103-05, 112-19.
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revised the 20-F form, an application similar to a consolidated registration statement and an annual report form. 1 ' Items required on the 20-F
form include descriptions of the registrant's business, accounting principles used by the registrant, and the registrant's current business prospects. 132 To complement the 20-F form, the Commission also promulgated three new instruments to ease foreign registration:"3 3 forms F-i,'"
F-2, 3 5 and F-3.13 8 Analogous to forms S-1, 13 7 S-21"8 and S-31 "9 used by
domestic issuers, this new system created an integrated disclosure system
for foreign registrants. 140
Form F-i, like its S-1 counterpart, requires only basic information,
similar to that required by 20-F. Form F-2, however, may be utilized
only by issuers who have completed all other reporting requirements
under sections 12 and 15(d) of the Exchange Act, 141 or who have completed a 20-F form. Form F-2 applicants must also be "world class"
issuers (those whose shares have a market value exceeding $300 million). 142 F-3 qualifications are almost identical to those of F-2, but "nonworld class" issuers may use
Form F-3 if the offering is investment
143
grade non-convertible debt.
The SEC has also redesigned certain traditional financial instruments
in order to encourage registration. For example, American Depositary
Receipts (ADR's) have existed since 1927,4 but their growth has

131. Integrated Disclosure System for Private Investors, Securities Act Release No.
6360, 46 Fed. Reg. 58511 (Dec. 2, 1981).
132. Id. at 58514.
133. Adoption of Foreign Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No.
6437, 47 Fed. Reg. 54764 (Dec. 6, 1982).
134. 17 C.F.R. § 239.31 (1988).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 239.32 (1988).
136. 17 C.F.R. § 239.33 (1988).
137. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1988).
138. 17 C.F.R. § 239.12 (1988).
139. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (1988).
140. See Lorenz, supra note 120, at 799-801. See also Cox, Internationalizationof
the Capital Markets: The Experience of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 11
MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 201, 203 (1987).

141. 17 C.F.R. § 239.32(b)(1) (1988). These provisions mandate registration of companies with the Commission if the firms are listed on an exchange or possess over 300
shareholders of record. Id.
142. Form F-2, General Instructions (I)(B)(2), 47 Fed. Reg. 54,774 (Dec. 6, 1982).
143. Form F-3, General Instructions (II)(A)(4), 47 Fed. Reg. 54,778 (Dec. 6, 1982).
144. Royston, The Regulation of American Depositary Receipts: Americanization of
the InternationalCapital Markets, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 87, 87-88 (1985);

see also Lorenz, supra note 120, at 801-04.

1988]

FOREIGN SECURITIES OFFERINGS

skyrocketed since the amending of both Form F-6 145 and rule 12g3-2. 4 6
ADR's are "negotiable receipts issued by a United States bank or trust
company (the Depositary) to evidence ownership of securities of a foreign company deposited with the Depositary's office or agent in the foreign country. "' 1, ADR's possess certain advantages over normal forms of
foreign stock ownership because of the "voluntarisim principle: " 48 in
exchange for volunteered information pursuant to Form F-6 (which can
be used only if the issuer does not plan share distribution)," 9 the SEC
will not demand more comprehensive information from the issuer or
security holder.1 50 Absent the shortcut provided to issuers by ADR's,
United States non-institutional holdings of non-registered securities
would be much more difficult to maintain.
In more recent years, the SEC has not only attempted to break down
internal barriers to capital flow, but has entertained the idea of a common information disclosure system involving other countries. In Securities Act Release No. 6568,11 the Commission requested comment on
a proposed standardized prospectus for use within the United States,
Canada and the United Kingdom. Reasons for the program ranged from
the wide flow of capital among the three nations to the existence of similar underwriting systems.152 The Release also suggested a reciprocity
system: an offering document used by an issuer in one country would
fulfill similar document requirements in the other two nations. 53 One
problem with this proposal was that British and Canadian issues would
145. 17 C.F.R. § 239.36 (1988).
146. In 1983 the Commission promulgated rule 12g3-2 of the Exchange Act which
allowed registration exemption for American Depositary Receipts and other select foreign securities. 17 C.F.R. 240.12g3-2 (1988). The rule exempts securities of foreign issuers from compliance with § 12 (g) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1988), if the
securities have fewer than 300 resident holders in the United States. Id. An important
part of this regulation pertaining to the CREF-France Letters is that under subsection
(b) of the new rule, private issues do not have to be registered so long as the issuer files
information required by the issuer's home country. See also L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS
OF SECURITIES REGULATION 68-72 (1988); Lorenz, supra note 120, at 801-04.
147. Royston, supra note 144, at 87.
148. Id. at 88-89.
149. 17 C.F.R. § 239.36 (1988).
150. Royston, supra note 144, at 89. For an example of how the ADR system facilitates complex offerings, see Banco Central, S.A., SEC No-Action Letter (June 20, 1987)
(Spanish bank offering of ADR's); see also Relief Granted in InternationalOffering of
Spanish Bank Securities, 19 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1068 (July 17, 1987).
151. Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No.
6568, 50 Fed. Reg. 9281 (Mar. 7, 1985).
152. Id. at 9281-83.
153. Id. at 9283.
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still face civil liability under section 11 of the Securities Act for material
misstatements in a stock registration, even if such statements complied
with British or Canadian registration requirements."' The SEC also
proposed that fair statutory standards be enacted to allow for synthesization of the proposals, even though some United States liability provisions
would again apply.1 55 Comments from the American Bar Association
and others, though, indicate that while Release 33-6568 generated interest in the financial community, uncertainty over SEC interpretation of
what constitutes appropriate disclosure effectively postponed the reciprocity and common prospectus proposals.' 58
United States and world financial community reception of other SEC
proposals has been even less enthusiastic. In mid-1980s, the Director
of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, John Fedders, suggested a
"waiver by conduct" rule whereby illegal activities in the United States
by foreign issuers would constitute a waiver of the protection of the securities laws of that party's home country.' 5 7 This meant an accused
party would be subject to United States jurisdiction. Equalization of
treatment for foreign and domestic violators of United States securities
law seemed attractive, but opposition was immediate.' 58 Commentators
believed that the measures would cause an opposite result: 59 to protect
their sovereignty, foreign governments would hinder United States investigations of foreign securities fraud. In turn, cooperation among nations
in furthering international capital movements would be reduced.'
Even though reform in the area of public international offerings appears likely to occur, questions remain as to how private offerings fit
within the spirit of internationalization. Normally, foreign private placements of stock in the United States must first meet an exemption in the
Securities Act, usually under regulation D.' Foreign issuer usage of

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Lorenz, supra note 120, at 807-08.
157. Fedders, Policing Trans-Border Fraud in the United States Securities Markets: The "Waiver by Conduct" Concept-a PossibleAlternative or a StartingPointfor
Discussions?, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 477 (1985).
158. Id.
159. De Capitani, Response to Fedders' "Wavier by Conduct", 6 J. COMP. Bus. &
CAP. MKT. L. 331 (1984); see also Singer, The InternationalizedSecurities Market and
InternationalLaw-A Reply to John M. Fedders, 6 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L.
345 (1984); Wymeersch, Response to Fedders' "Wavier by Conduct", 6 J. COMP. Bus.
& CAP. MKT. L. 339 (1984).
160. De Capitani, supra note 159, at 332-34.
161. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1988).
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this regulation is conditioned upon filing of a 20-F form.1 1 2 Outside of
meeting this requirement, most foreign issuers may freely distribute their
securities to United States citizens. Regulation D states that "[o]ffers and
sales of securities to foreign persons made outside the United States effected in a manner that will result in the securities coming to rest abroad
If the foreign issuer
generally need not be registered under the Act."''
places its stock with only sophisticated or accredited investors,'" issuers
can raise unlimited dollar amounts. 6 5 Regulation D, however, contains
ceilings on the amounts offerors may raise, based on the number of nonaccredited investors who wish to participate: the more investors present,
1 66
the lower the ceiling on funds the unregistered offering may garner.
One source of international securities placement law that has generated much discussion is Securities Act Release No. 4708. The product of
a specially created executive task force, 1 7 the Release called for reform
of certain aspects of the registration requirements under the Securities
Act. In the first part of the Release, the SEC reviewed the broad interpretation section 2(7) of the Securities Act gives to the term "interstate
commerce," and how courts have interpreted section 5 of this Act to protect primarily United States investors.1 6 ' The Release also noted that
even though the SEC previously held that the Securities Act properly
encompassed all securities issued to United States citizens, certain limitations should prevail. Securities issued to United States service personnel
abroad, for example, would still be protected, but other foreign-based
issues that included a few United States citizens were not in the true
sense "public offerings." 6" Because of the reduced scope of these offerings, the Commission would henceforth grant such issues an exemption

162. See supra notes 131-32.
163. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 preliminary note 7 (1988).
164. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (1988).
165. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1988).
166. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504-.505 (1988); see also L. SODFRQUIST, supra note 9, at
549-50 (Supp. 1985).
167. Release 33-4708, supra note 111. The group's official name was the "Presidential Task Force on Promoting Increased Foreign Investment in the United States Corporate Securities and Increased Foreign Financing for United States Corporations Operating Abroad." Id.
168. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968). Although the
Second Circuit decided the case after the SEC published Release 33-4708, the decision
reflected judicial attitudes about whether certain conduct would actually ensure that the
securities remain in foreign hands. See also Evans, Offerings of Securities Solely to Foreign Investors, 40 Bus. LAW 69, 70 (1984).
169. See Release 33-4708, supra note 111.
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under section 4(2) of the Securities Act.17
Release 33-4708 also addressed the applicability of section 15(a) of the
Exchange Act to foreign underwriters.
Section 15(a) prohibits brokers
and dealers from using means of interstate commerce to induce purchases
or sales of a security unless each underwriter has registered with the
SEC. " 2 The Release emphasized that future regulation of foreign underwriters was unnecessary even in circumstances in which United
States securities were being distributed abroad. 7 The Release stated
that registration of underwriters was necessary only if the foreign underwriter belonged to an underwriting syndicate in the United States, and if
such underwriter during the stock issue would exercise greater powers
over transactions than that exercised by the underwriter's United States
17 4
counterparts.
An interesting aspect of Release 33-4708 as it relates to the French
privatizations is that the Release previously stood only for the proposition that foreign or United States-issued securities primarily intended for
foreign markets did not have to be registered. 17 5 CREF, however, correctly dissected an unanswered question of Release 33-4708: technically
the Release applied to brokers dealing with securities issued in the
United States, not shares issued abroad. 6 CREF contended, though,
that the Release applied by analogy since the likelihood of the securities
"coming to rest" in the United States secondary markets was remote. 17 7
CREF further argued that by extending the logic of the Release and
since redistribution to the United States was unlikely, warnings regard-

170. At the time when the SEC published Release 33-4708, the public offering exemption was codified at section 4(1) of the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(1) (1958).
Subsequent legislation placed this exemption at section 4(2) of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964). Securities Act Amendment of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (78 Stat.) 565, 580; see also supra note 92.
171. Release 33-4708, supra note 111.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (1982).
173. Release 33-4708, supra note 111.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 981 n.12 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975);
F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1219, 1220 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (dismissal of Canadian company's suit over unregistered foreign debentures); see also InfraRed Assoc., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 13, 1985) (American
company's offering solely to European investors granted a 33-4708 exemption so long as
issuer complied with restrictions preventing resales of shares in the United States).
176. CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,363; see also French Privatization,supra note
10, at 1408.
177. CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,363.
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ing the prohibition of resales such as reminders on share certificates,
were unnecessary.17 8
Statements by CREF and the French Government in their no-action
letter requests belie the uncertainty that the international financial community experiences with United States securities regulations in general
and Release 33-4708 in particular. If the OREF-France Letters are a
major step in the liberalization of international securities placements, the
SEC used an unusual forum in which to show its change in attitude.
Most policy changes in United States securities regulation have come
about through interpretative releases or through court decisions.17 Yet
the gradual changes in United States regulation of offerings reflect the
SEC balance between easy capital access and investor protection. The
unusual aspect of the CREF-France Letters is that in a single effort the
SEC has enabled foreign issuers greater flexibility and access to United
States capital markets.
Despite the slow pace of reform heretofore, some procedures still must
be readjusted. Perhaps the common prospectus proposal 80 could be integrated with EEC reporting requirements resulting in a uniform code for
registration of European issues."' But despite the reforms so far, foreign
issuers seem to want to have it both ways. They wish complete access to
United States markets but with limited acquiescence to United States
laws. Whether the balance between liberalization and investor protection
has been tipped to the former can only be determined after a restructured foreign security placement system has been operating in the United
States for some time. Once this occurs, though, it may be too late to
protect defrauded investors.

IV.

INTEGRATION ISSUES

A primary issue in the CREF-France Letters was whether the private
placements to the American institutional investors would lose any exemption under the Securities Act because of the placements' coincidence
with the public offering to French citizens and residents.1 82 Under the

178. Id.; see also France Letter, supra note 10, at 77,435.
179. The no-action letter process allows the Commission to redevelop new policies
and gauge industry response before a final promulgation is made. Lemke, supra note 85,
at 1022-23.
180. See Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, supra note 151.
181.

Lorenz, supra note 120, at 815. Lorenz does not minimize the inherent difficul-

ties of integrating EEC law with the common prospectus approach, yet the proposal
itself does not contradict any current Canadian, British, or EEC laws. Id.
182. See, e.g., CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,363.
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"integration doctrine," issuers must not attempt to divide stock issues
into multiple stages so that each stage qualifies as an exempted issue. If
this does occur, the SEC compels the issuer to register the securities or
face possible violations of the Securities Act.""3
The SEC considers five factors in determining whether transactions
are part of an integrated distribution:
Whether (1) the different offerings are part of a single plan of financing,
(2) the offerings involve issuance of the same class of security, (3) the
offerings are made at or about the same time, (4) the same type of consideration is to be received, [and] (5) the offerings are made for the same
general purpose.18
The number of integration doctrine exemptions has expanded over the
years, 8 5 but explicit SEC guidelines on integration of international stock
issuances remains unformulated. This, in part, resulted from the SEC's
refusal to issue no-action letters on integration questions between 1979
and 1984.186 Therefore, Release 33-4708 by default, served as the law
on the integration of international stock placements. According to the
Release, section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts "transactions by an
issuer not involving any public offering. '1 8 7 More important, the Release
states: "Generally, transactions otherwise meeting the requirements of
[33-4708] need not be integrated with simultaneous offerings being made
abroad and, therefore, are not subject to the registration requirements of
the Act solely because a foreign offering is being made concurrently with
183. See generally ABA Report, supra note 8, at 4.
184. Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 27 Fed. Reg.
11316, 11317 (November 16, 1962).
185. ABA Report, supra note 8, at 25-41. The Act presently contains five transaction exemptions pertaining to integration:
a) the single issuer exchange exemption found in section 3(a)(9) ...
b) the regulated exchange exemption found in section 3(a)(10)... ;
c) the intrastate offering exemptions found in section 3(a)(11) of the Act and in
SEC rule 147 thereunder;
d) the private offering exemptions found in section 4(2) of the Act and in SEC
rule 506 thereunder; and
e) the de minimis offering exemptions found in sections 3(b) and 4(6) of the Act
and in SEC rules 504 and 505 and regulation A thereunder.
Id. at 10.
186. See id. at 7-8 & n.4. In 1985 the SEC Division of Corporate Finance publicly
announced it would reinstitute answering no-action letters on integration questions. Commissioners Debate Delaware Poison Pill Case at 'SEC Speaks', 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 400, 403 (Mar. 8, 1985). This change probably resulted from the introduction of
regulation D, rather than from an internal policy change by the SEC.
187. Release 33-4708, supra note 111; see also supra note 170.
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the American private placement. .

..

""'

Rules 504, 505 and 506 of regulation D contain guidelines for registration exemption, based on dollar amounts to be raised or the number of
investors." 89 In contrast, Release 33-4708 emphasizes that the different
placements of the stock alone-one issue in the United States, the other
abroad- renders integration problems moot.' 90 Some experts have debated whether regulation D, and not Release 33-4708, is the legitimate
source for exempting concurrent international and domestic stock placements that otherwise would pose integration problems. 9 In 1982, the
SEC twice modified regulation D,' 92 including rule 502,'9

to read that

international stock transactions otherwise meeting the requirements for a
regulation D exemption would not be considered at all integrated.,"" In
addition, the amended regulation D stated that foreign offerees would
not be counted toward the maximum amount of purchasers allowable for
a registration exemption. 95 To coincide with this measure, the Commis-

188. Release 33-4708, supra note 111.
189. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.506 (1988). Rule 504 provides an exemption for limited
offers and sales of securities not exceeding $1 million. Rule 505 limits issues under this
exemption to $5 million or less. In addition, only thirty-five unaccredited investors may
participate in such an offering. Rule 506 allows offers of unlimited dollar amounts, but
only thirty-five unaccredited investors, each of whom (or their representative) must have
knowledge of financial or business matters, may participate.
190. Release 33-4708, supra note 111.
191. See, e.g., ABA Report, supra note 8, at 65.
192. Revision of Certain Exemptions From Registration for Transactions Involving
Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11251, 11262
(1982); Adoption of Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure System, supra note 133, at
54771.
193. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (1988).
194. Current rule 502(a) reads in part:
(a) Integration. All sales that are part of the same Regulation D offering must
meet all of the terms and conditions of Regulation D. Offers and sales that are
made more than six months before the start of a Regulation D offering or are
made more than six months after completion of a Regulation D offering will not
be considered part of that Regulation D offering, so long as during those six
month periods there are no offers or sales of securities by or for the issuer that are
of the same or a similar class as those offered or sold under Regulation D, other
than those offers or sales of securities under an employee benefit plan as defined in
rule 405 under the Act....
17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (1988) (citations omitted).
195. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 preliminary note 7 (1988). Preliminary note 7 states in part:
Offers and sales of securities to foreign persons made outside the United States
effected in a manner that will result in the securities coming to rest abroad generally need not be registered under the [Securities] Act. This intrepretation may be
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sion held it would not count proceeds from foreign purchasers in aggregating the dollar amounts of stock issued under the revenue ceilings of
rules 504 and 505.16
Various no-action letters by the SEC show a continuing expansion of
Release 33-4708's interpretation of the integration question. The SEC
will not deem as integrated concurrent stock issues that involve one nonUnited States offering so long as the situs of each offering is different.197
This policy decision oddly began during the time in which the Commission maintained a moratorium on no-action letters concerning integration
under regulation D. The Commission in Grffith Laboratories,Inc., 98
used a no-action letter response to state that Release 33-4708 could be
the basis for non-integration of multiply-placed offerings.
In Griffith, an Illinois corporation proposed an offer to the shareholders of its Canadian affiliate to exchange Griffith United States shares for
all the outstanding Griffith Canadian stock. Complicating the scenario,
the original founders and immediate family members of Griffith U.S.A.
also founded the Canadian affiliate.1 9 As the decades passed, ownership
in the affiliate came under the control of another family close to the
American founders. Yet because of the tax laws in effect in the early
1970s, both companies believed that consolidation of the two firms would
be in their best interest.200
The difficulty for integration purposes was that United States citizens
held over sixty percent of Griffith Canada.0 1 This left open the existence of two concurrent offerings: one to Griffith Canada shareholders in

relied on for such offers and sales even if coincident offers and sales are made
under Regulation D inside the United States.... [P]ersons who are not citizens or
residents of the United States would not be counted in the calculation of the number of purchasers. Similarly, proceeds from sales to foreign purchasers would not
be included in the aggregate offering price. The provisions of this note, however,
do not apply if the issuer elects to rely solely on Regulation D for offer or sales to
foreign persons.
Id. (citations omitted). See generally Evans, supra note 168, at 78.
196. Release 33-4708, supra note 111. This provision has served as a primary
source from which exceptions to registration have been made, even without reliance on
regulation D. See, e.g., Intron, Ltd. SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 8, 1984) (concurrent
offerings to Utah and West European citizens not subject to regulation D if issuer meets
33-4708 guidelines); see also European Offering of Block of Shares Does not Defeat
Compliance with Rule 504, 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2009 (Dec. 21, 1984).
197. See, e.g., L. Texas Petroleum, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (uly 16, 1981).
198. Griffith Laboratories, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (June 17, 1974).
199. Id. (letter of applicant at 3-4)
200. Id. (letter of applicant at 4).
201. Id. (letter of applicant at 5).
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the United States, the other to Griffith Canada shareholders outside of
the United States. Counsel for Griffith urged the SEC to pass favorably
on their no-action request because of a possible private placement exemption in the Securities Act. According to the company, the offering to
Griffith Canada shareholders of United States citizenship did not constitute a public offering.2 2 The SEC refused to answer the issue of
whether the offering qualified under as a section 4(2) exemption and
cited its policy of not responding to integration questions.2" 3 The SEC,
however, did respond affirmatively to Griffith's other contention that the
proposed offering met Release 33-4708 standards on integration of foreign and domestic offerings.204 Because Griffith planned to offer the
shares to a fairly large number of non-United States citizens, the SEC
granted an exemption.20 5
The Commission next applied Release 33-4708 to questions of integrated partnership rights in no-action letters such as Forest Oil Co.20° In
Forest Oil Co., the applicant, a United States corporation, planned to
sell limited oil drilling partnership rights20 7 to interested parties outside
the United States and Canada.20 ' Forest Oil, however, had just made
similar partnership offers to United States citizens. To differentiate the
offerings, Forest planned to segregate the foreign and domestic partnerships into different exploration projects. The company also proposed to
alter significantly the terms of the partnership agreements between the
two sets of investors. 2 9 Two other Forest proposals, however, probably
swayed the SEC. Forest planned measures to prevent United States and
Canadian investor access to the new limited partnership interests, and
the company promised to maintain official silence during the concurrent

202. Id. (letter of applicant at 6).
203. Id. (SEC response at 3).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Forest Oil Co., SEC No-Action Letter (July 10, 1980).
207. Partnership rights qualify as a security. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1982); see also,
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); Evans, supra note 168, at 7172.
208. The exemption included Canadian issues because of regulation A of the Securities Act Rules. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.264 (1988). This regulation states that offerors
with principal businesses in Canada must gain eligibility for its offering in the home
province of its business before a United States exemption for registration will be granted.
17 C.F.R. § 230.253(b) (1988); see Pioneer Ventures Limited Partnership, SEC NoAction Letter (Mar. 31, 1983); Evans, supra note 168, at 76.
209. Neither the no-action letter application, nor the SEC's reply describes the actual differences in the terms.
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issue as a means to abate market speculation in the offerings.2 1 °
The growth in Release 33-4708's use in international integration matters escalated with the Commission's application of the intrastate offering exemption of the Securities Act 21 to the Release to produce an exemption for concurrent intrastate and foreign offerings. Section 3(a)(11)
of the Securities Act exempts from registration securities belonging to an
issue offered and sold to investors within a single state so long as the
issuer resides and does business within that state.2 12 The SEC previously
held that the corresponding Securities Act rule provision, rule 147,13 did
not apply to foreign investors because the rule considered share offers to
foreign investors to be part of the same issue offered to intrastate investors. Since the Commission interpreted rule 147 at that time to cover just
intrastate investors, the presence of foreign investors would remove any
exemption.2 14
The SEC changed its position on this question in Scientific Manufacturing, Inc. 215 in which a privately-held California hospital equipment
corporation wished to issue shares to citizens of Hong Kong, as well as
to California residents. In its no-action request, the company admitted its
knowledge of SEC practice against applying Release 33-4708 to intrastate foreign offerings. 216 The applicant stressed, however, it would apply the resale restrictions of rule 147(e) and (f) (the intrastate "safe harbor" rule) 217 to prevent United States citizens outside of California from
210. Forest Oil Co., supra note 206 (letter of applicant June 17, 1980).
211. 15 U.S.C. 77c(a)(11) (1982).
212. Id.
213. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1988).
214. See ABA Report, supra note 8, at 65. For a general overview of the § 3(a)(11)
exemption, see section 3(a)(11) Exemption for Local Offerings, Securities Act Release
No. 4434, 26 Fed. Reg. 11896 (Dec. 13, 1961). See also Notice of Adoption of Rule 147
under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release No. 5450, 39 Fed. Reg. 2353
(Jan. 7, 1974); L. SODERQUIST, supra note 9, at 251-270.
215. Scientific Manufacturing, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,505, at 78,625 (May 12, 1983); see also Evans,'
supra note 168, at 77.
216. Scientific Manufacturing, Inc., supra note 215, at 78,625.
217. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e)-(f) (1988). Relevant parts state:
(e) Limitation of resales. During the period in which securities that are part of
an issue are being offered and sold by the issuer, and for a period of nine months
from the date of the last sale by the issuer of such securities, all resales of any part
of the issue, by any person, shall be made only to persons within such state or
territory.
(0 Precautionsagainst interstateoffers and sales. (1) The issuer shall, in connection with any securities sold by it pursuant to this rule:
(i) Place a legend on the certificate or other document evidencing the security
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obtaining the shares.2 1 Noting these resale barriers, the SEC granted an
exemption. Surprisingly, though, the Commission also stated that the
previous no-action finding that intrastate foreign offerings would be integrated could be ignored.2 19
The majority of Release 33-4708 exemptions have dealt with foreign
public and domestic private offerings, but a recent no-action letter indicated that private foreign and private domestic offerings may be made
simultaneously without becoming integrated. 2 ° A Canadian film exhibitor with shares traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange, Cineplex Odeon
Corp., planned to make a United States private offering along with a
private placement to company executives in Canada. After reviewing the
company's assurances that limits on resales would be enacted, the SEC
issued a no-action letter without requiring additional procedures.221
By liberalizing the integration exemption in the CREF-France Letters, the SEC may have also made it difficult to limit future public offerings of foreign corporate securities, even if such securities come to rest in
the United States. Rule 152 of the Securities Act222 provides that the
public offering exemption continues even though the issuer makes subsequent offerings. The rule, however, does not prescribe a time limit in
which exempt offerings must be made. 2 ' Given this factor and the
SEC's broad interpretation of rule 152, the rule could easily work
against SEC enforcement of securities laws. For example, because Law
86-793 mandates that the French Government maximize revenues from
the privatized stock sales,2 24 France could restructure the public offer-

stating that the securities have not been registered under the Act and setting forth
the limitations on resale contained in paragraph (e) of this section;
(ii) Issue stop transfer instructions to the issuer's transfer agent, if any, with
respect to the securities, or, if the issuer transfers its own securities make a notation in the appropriate records of the issuer; and
(iii) Obtain a written representation from each purchaser as to his residence.
Id. § 230.147(e)-(O(1) (1988) (notes omitted). See also Evans, supra note 168, at 77.
218. Scientific Manufacturing, Inc., supra note 215, at 78,625.
219. Id. at 78,626.
220. Cineplex Odeon Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %78,474 at 77,750 (Mar. 19, 1987).
221. Id. at 77,752.
222. 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1988). The only proviso to this rule is that funds from
the exempt offerings and future offerings must be separate so that an "integrated" set of
funds does not exist. Caspar, TransnationalOfferings and the Problem of Integration,
34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 47, 49 (1979).
223. Securities experts believe six to twelve months is sufficient to meet the limits of
rule 152. Caspar, supra note 222, at 49.
224. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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ings, in the name of revenue enhancement, to coincide with the private
placements. In such a situation, the SEC, in undertaking a securities
fraud action arising from the privatization program, may find it difficult
to sort out the sources of funding.
Integration itself is more of a procedural issue-the SEC wants to
ensure that issuers do not attempt to attach unregistered offerings onto
registered or exempt stock issues. Therefore, from one point of view, the
use of Release 33-4708 to widen the exceptions to the integration doctrine is of little direct concern to individual investors. The use of Release
33-4708 in this area does provide a useful tool for foreign-based issuers
since few other United States securities law provisions cover this question. Additionally, the Release's use in the CREF-France situation will
enable foreign issuers to more effectively and less expensively market
capital to the United States. On the other hand, given the complexity of
international stock offerings, abuses by foreign issuers of SEC integration exemptions could easily occur. This should be of great concern because, unlike in a domestic violation, jurisdiction may be hard to obtain
over a foreign issuer who disguises an unregistered offering as one that
has met SEC approval. This last factor is what may make the SEC's
decision in the CREF-France Letters potentially harmful for United
States investors.
V.

RESALE ISSUES POSED BY THE SEC APPROVAL

In reviewing requests for a registration exemption, one of the SEC's
greatest concerns has been whether resales of the unregistered securities
in question will occur in the United States. Issuers must structure stock
placements so that initial purchasers cannot resell the securities to unsophisticated investors. The primary tool for allowing resales of domestic
privately-held shares continues to be the section "4(11 )" exemption of
the Securities Act.22 5 This exemption contains elements of the section
4(1)226 exemption allowing transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or dealer, and parts of the section 4(2) private placement exemption. 2 In securities placements involving concurrent foreign
and domestic offerings, however, the Commission has highlighted the im225. See The Section "4 (10)" Phenomenon:Private Resales of "Restricted" Securities, 34 Bus. LAW. 1961 (1979), reprinted in L. SODERQUIST, supra note 9, at 333.
The SEC has continually upheld these exemptions even though the Securities Act Rules
do not explicitly state the exceptions-the "safe harbor" has evolved more as a matter of
rule construction. Id.; see also supra note 9.
226. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1982).
227. Id. § 77d(2).
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portance of Release 33-4708.22

Because of SEC emphasis on Release 33-4708 instead of on regular
Securities Act exemptions, issuers must construct "anti-flowback" provisions: procedures designed to prevent the unregistered securities from being resold in the United States. The SEC has attempted to define an
objective test for determining whether specific issuer measures satisfy the
anti-flowback requirement, and whether a certain amount of time is
necessary before the stocks have "come to rest" outside of the United
States.2 29 Most of the recent decisions, however, have been made on an
ad hoc basis.
The SEC has indicated, though, that the combination of the following
anti-flowback measures will suffice to qualify an issuer for an exemption:
(a) No sales may be made to American nationals, which terms includes
both American citizens and resident aliens.
(b) Each foreign investor must represent that he is purchasing the securities for his own account and not for the account of an American national.
(c) The underwriters and investors must represent that they will not resell
the securities in the United States or to United States residents.
(d) The subject securities may not be transferred for a period of ninety
days after the conclusion of the foreign offering ....
(e) The investor may not resell the securities after such 90-day period in
the United States or to United States nationals ....
(f) The prospectus must include a legend to the effect the securities being
offered have not been registered with the Commission.
(g) The issuer's transfer agents must be instructed to stop any transfer
which violates or is not in compliance with anti-flowback transfer
restrictions.2"'
The SEC granted a no-action letter to CREF and to the French Government because of the anti-flowback precautions planned for each issue.2 31 Part of these safeguards, according to the French Government's
letter, consisted of traditional Euromarket measures.23 2 These Euro-

228. See supra note 195.
229. See Cardiodynamics, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (June 4, 1974). Rule 144(k)
of the Securities Act provides, however, that if an investor not affiliated with the issuer
holds the securities for three years, the investor may resell the securities in any manner.
17 C.F.R. § 230.144(k) (1988); see also Evans, supra note 168, at 79-81.
230. ABA Report, supra note 8, at 66-67.
231. CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,362-363; France Letter, supra note 10, at
77,435.
232. Id. The letter refers to: "anti-integration measures," but such measures focused
on resale problems. See id.
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market structures, though not codified in United States, French or European Economic Community (EEC) law, arguably still have a legal basis
in EEC directives governing capital movements233 and in the policies of
the SEC as interpreted through no-action letters.
One no-action letter, The Singer Co., 3 exemplifies the Euromarket
procedures that meet SEC approval. The Singer Company proposed a
foreign offering of $50 million of non-exchangeable guaranteed notes issued pursuant to an indenture with a United States trustee, the Chase
Manhattan Bank, and payable at the trustee's New York City office and
at designated European paying agencies. Formerly, under the United
States Interest Equalization Tax (IET), foreign-issued bonds were unlikely to flow back into the United States since the bonds were subject to
an additional tax once they reached United States bondholders.2 3 After
the IET's repeal, few constraints, outside of general economic conditions,
existed to prevent flowbacks.
To counteract this problem, the managing underwriter for the offering, Goldman Sachs International Corp., proposed that underwriters and
selling groups be sent notices regarding the unregistered nature of the
notes in question.23 6 The firm planned to place provisions in its contracts
with underwriters stating that no resales to United States citizens could
occur until ninety days after the completion of the offering.23 7 Similar
restrictions would be applied to selling group-dealers. 3 " In addition, an
offering circular akin to a prospectus, containing information as to the
lack of Securities Act registration, was to be issued in Europe by
Goldman Sachs. The underwriter promised delivery of notes bearing a
legend about such resale restrictions.2 39 Given this wealth of precaution-

233.

For a general overview of EEC laws on securities, see Lorenz, supra note 120,

at 810-13; Oliver, Free Movement of CapitalBetween Member States: Article 67(1) EEC
and the Implementing Directives, 9 EURO. L. REv. 401 (1984); Woolridge, Some Recent
Community Legislation in the Field of Securities Law, 10 EURO. L. REv. 3 (1985).
234. The Singer Co., SEC No-Action Letter [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,979 (Aug. 2, 1974).

235. Interest Equalization Tax of 1953-64, I.R.C. §§ 4911-4922, 4931 (1976), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1976, 94 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1814 (1976);
see also Haseltine, United States Tax and Securities Laws: Working "Together" Toward Different Goals in Eurobond Financings, 11 MD. J. INT'L & L. & TRADE 221,
226-27 (1987).
236. The Singer Co., supra note 234, at 84,517-18; see also Haseltine, supra note
235, at 227 n.21.237. The Singer Co., supra note 234, at 84,519.

238. Id.
239. Id. Other safeguards included managing underwriter requests to offerors that
guidelines were followed, and the issuance of a press release highlighting the bond's
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ary measures, the SEC approved Singer's application.2 40 Singer's importance in the area of resales, though, is manifested by the continued use
by other no-action applicants of the anti-flowback provisions proposed by
the Singer Company.2 41
Other no-action letters indicate that the Commission will continue to
demand adequate flowback safeguards. In answering the first no-action
request of Foote, Cone & Belding Communications, Inc., 42 (FOB) the
SEC refused to assure the firm that sales of stock to foreign employees
would meet an exemption absent proper flowback principles. In its initial application, FCB proposed to conduct a public offering of over two
million shares through the New York Stock Exchange.24 3 In addition,
the firm requested permission to offer and sell up to 25,000 shares of
treasury stock to about ten individuals who managed FCB offices
abroad.2 44 Through this arrangement, FCB subsidiaries would loan the
purchase price of the shares to the individuals, none of whom were
United States citizens.2 45 The firm constructed its anti-flowback provision around a ninety day resale prohibition.2 4 The SEC replied that the
active trading of the firm's shares on the New York Exchange rendered
the short-term restriction on resales insufficient.2 47 After this rejection,
FCB amended its proposal so that transfers would be prohibited for
ninety days, but with restrictions being extended until counsel for the
firm decided that the public stock issue had come to rest.2 4 Because of
this change, the Commission determined that the resale provisions would

unavailability in the United States. Id. at 84,519-520.
240. In comparison, CREF and the French Government proposed many of these
same restrictions but with less emphasis on post-offer legending of shares. See CREF I,
supra note 10, at 77,362-63; France Letter, supra note 10, at 77,435.
241. See, e.g., InfraRed Assoc., Inc., supra note 175 (common stock offering);
Goldman, Sachs & Co., SEC No-Action Letter [1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,164 at 76,711; Bank Leumi le-Israel, B.M, SEC No-Action Letter (July 7,
1983) (bond offering); Pioneer Ventures, Limited Partnership, supra note 208 (partner-

ship rights); see also Unregistered Foreign Bank Notes May Be Sold to Non-Resident
Aliens, 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1622 (Aug. 19, 1983).
242. Foote, Cone & Belding Communications, Inc., SEC No-Action Letters [19751976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,523 at 86,360, 86,361-62 (Apr. 6,
1976).
243. Id. at 86,363.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.

247. Id.
248. Foote, Cone & Belding Communications, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter [19771978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,275 at 88,416 (May 20, 1976).
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not imperil any exemption.249
Recent no-action letters have tested the SEC's interpretation of
whether certain distribution schemes qualify for a registration exemption. In Wordplex Information Systems PLC,250 a British corporation
proposed to issue option shares to company executives resident in California. Because Wordplex listed its stock on the London Exchange251 the
SEC could have speculated that, without restrictions, the stocks could be
resold to United States citizens. To avoid any resale problems, Wordplex
drew up a complicated arrangement by which California holders would
assign their stocks to a trustee who would hold the shares until the executives left the firm. 2 "2 Because of this trust arrangement, and because a
viable public market for Wordplex's stock did not exist in the United
States, the SEC granted approval.2 3
As opposed to its treatment of the integration doctrine, the Commission has maintained a conservative stance regarding resales, with the
only deviation being the granting of no-action letters for unusual stock
placement schemes such as Wordplex. Even in situations such as that of
Wordplex, the SEC still has focused on the strength of the issuer's market in the United States-if an active market existed, the SEC required
more flowback restrictions.2 54 Also, the SEC seems to take into consideration the home country of the issuer and the market on which the is-

249. Id. at 88,416. The FCB letter may not be applicable today because the SEC
definition of restricted securities has changed. If FCB made the same request today, the
SEC would probably grant an exemption. See Evans, supra note 168, at 79-80.
250. Wordplex Information Systems PLC, SEC No-Action Letter (publicly available
Dec. 5, 1985) (June 6, 1985 letter of applicant at 2); see also Lang, Gutowitz, Besen &
Gardner, Transnational Acquisitions and Takeovers: Certain Peculiar Problems in
18TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIEs REGULATION, 542 PRAC. L. INST. (B4-6772)
247, 257-58 (1986) (discussion of Wordplex no-action request).
251. Wordplex Information Systems PLC (June 6, 1985 letter of applicant at 1).
252. Id. (July 25, 1985 letter of applicant).
253. Id. (SEC reply). Retirement or employee stock option plans have been a frequent subject of no-action requests in the area of international securities placement. See,
e.g., Robbins, Robert B., (Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge), SEC No-Action Letter
(Mar. 15, 1988) (German banks proposing stock option plan for United States branch
employees); Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (july 8, 1980) (Canadian
metals firm proposing employee-vested retirement and stock option plans); see also Foreign Banks' Stock Plans Accorded '33, '40 Act Relief, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
757 (May 13, 1988).
254. Compare Wordplex Information Systems PLC, supra note 250 with Foote,
Cone & Belding Communications, Inc., supra note 242. The SEC denied approval of
FOB's initial no-action request because flowback procedures were not adequate in light
of the heavy trading of FCB's stock in the United States.
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suer's stocks are traded. 55 This may explain the SEC's approval of the
CREF-France Letters: because the issuer was the French Government
and since the companies were associated only with the Paris market, the
likelihood of the stocks coming to rest in the United States was small.
Yet it must be emphasized that the French privatization market had a
major impact on Western stock markets simply because of the large
number of shares available to the French public. If the Commission
would have paid more careful attention to the volume of shares going
into the French market as a result of the privatization,2 51 it is possible

that the Commission would not have granted approval. It seems unlikely
that only a few Americans might possibly purchase the shares, especially
since under the French program, foreign nationals, including Americans,
resident in France could purchase the privatized shares. 5 '
Another surprising aspect of the SEC's approval is that the French
Government proposal allows resales by United States institutional investors on the Paris Bourse without investigation into the identity of the
buyer.2 58 While the specter of widespread fraud by the French Government will not come to pass, irregularities could ensue in secondary market sales. If such a situation occurs, United States citizens, even those
residing in the United States, may be left without protection by the
Commission or the courts.
VI.

EVOLUTION OF RELEASE

33-4708

IN INTERNATIONAL

SECURITIES PLACEMENTS

Aside from its impact on integration and resale questions, Release 334708 has served as a primary source for the approval of foreign-issued
stock placements in the United States. An analysis of certain no-action
letters provides clues as to the basis of the SEC's decision to grant the
CREF-France no-action requests. However, the Commission did not
have the consistent opportunity to issue no-action letters regarding foreign stock issues until the early 1970s, several years after the Release 334708.25 This delay may not have been the result of mere inattention by

255.

Id. The SEC placed particular emphasis on FCB's presence on the New York

Exchange; issuers on less active exchanges are subjected to less SEC scrutiny.
256. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
257. See 1 DOING BusINESS, supra note 47, at § 3.0211][b]; see also supra note 115.
258.

French Privatization,supra note 10, at 1408; see also Chubb & Kelly, supra

note 15 (contention that SEC resale requirements in CREF-France Letters were
illusory).

259. Even now, with the expanded use of Release 33-4708, the SEC will only answer specific securities rules questions in "the most compelling circumstances." Buckeye
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the financial community towards the possibilities offered by Release 334708. Rather, the dearth of approvals could probably be attributed to the
relative conservatism of the international securities market that existed
until only recently.2"'
A major no-action letter that opened the way for future approvals of
concurrent domestic-foreign offerings combining private and public
placement elements was Wild Animal Kingdoms, Ltd.2"' This no-action
request concerned a British amusement park development company that
proposed concurrent public offerings in the United States and in Great
Britain. The SEC rejected initial exemption applications on the ground
that a United States resales market could develop because of inadequate
flowback precautions. 26 2 Additionly, the SEC feared that unissued stock
warrants that were part of the applicant's plan could remain open over a
long period of time, thus extending the offering time and leading to integration problems. To counteract these difficulties, Wild Animal Kingdoms proposed to enact a number of provisions. First, common stock
transfers could begin only after three years, 6 ' thereby precluding the
possibility that a market for the issuer's stock could develop in the
United States. Second, its company promised to implement an agreement
between itself and the underwriters guaranteeing that no concurrent offer of shares would be made to any existing shareholder, save one shareholder who already owned one-third of the stock of the issuer.2 " Many
of Wild Animal Kingdoms' anti-flowback and integration measures have
been implemented by other issuers,26 5 but the no-action application was
one of the first requests to utilize Release 33-4708 as a means of placing
foreign issued stock in the United States. As a result of this Wild Animal
Kingdom no-action grant, foreign firms have had little difficulty in obtaining exemptions from registration.

International, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (publicly available Mar. 7, 1977) (SEC reply
at 2).
260. See generally Thomas, supra note 121 (analysis of arguments against increased
foreign capital in the United States).
261. Wild Animal Kingdoms, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 4, 1974) [hereinafter WAK]. The SEC initially rejected the no-action request because it feared that unexercised underwriters' warrants could easily be utilized to effect a concurrent offering.
Wild Animal Kingdoms, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 14, 1973).
262. Id. (SEC reply letter at 2).
263. WAK, supra note 261 (letter of applicant Dec. 19, 1973, at 3). The three-year
limit was codified in Rule 144. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1988). Before the introduction of
Rule 144, courts held that a two-year hold on controlled securities was sufficient. See
United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480, 483-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
264. WAK, supra note 261 (letter of applicant Dec. 19, 1973, at 3).
265. See, e.g., InfraRed Assoc., Inc., supra note 175.
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The application of Release 33-4708, though, has grown from its former role as a lure for foreign corporations to issue corporate stock shares
in the United States.26 8 The scope of the Release not only includes stock
issues, but also housing interests, 2 7 partnerships 6 8 and commercial paper.2 89 Bond markets have proved to be one of the most fertile grounds
for Release 33-4708 based exemptions. Because of the Release's extensive use in this area, the SEC has perhaps become more comfortable
with making exemptions for institutional investors, the major customers
for bond underwriters.
In Goldman, Sachs & Co. for example, a lead manager of a concurrent United States-European offering sought exemption from registration
under the Securities Act for an issue of fixed rate non-convertible debt
securities.27 ° The applicant noted that standard anti-flowback measures
would be undertaken, such as notification in the offering invitations and
in the offering itself that resale restrictions to United States citizens
would be enforced.2" 1 In addition, Goldman Sachs planned contractual
arrangements between the underwriters and sellers through which the
prohibition on resales would be enforced.27 2 Potential purchasers under
the arrangement would also be reminded that unfavorable United States
tax treatment could ensue to United States citizens who obtained the
bonds.2 7 Because of the applicability of Release 33-4708 to the situation
and because of the significant flowback restrictions proposed the SEC did
not require registration.274
Goldman Sachs may explain the SEC's decision on the CREF-France
applications in that the ruling reflects the Commission's favorable attitude towards institutional investors. Because the CREF-France placements concerned institutional customers, 275 not private citizens, the Com-

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
See Williams Island Assoc., Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (July 28, 1983).
See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
AC Finance Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 17, 1987).
Goldman, Sachs & Co., supra note 241. See also Eurobonds Need Not Be Reg-

istered Even if U.S. Bonds Sold Concurrently, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1862
(Oct. 18, 1985).
271. Goldman, Sachs & Co., supra note 241, at 76,712.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 76,713. Under the relevant Internal Revenue Service Code provisions at
that time, losses on the sale of such bearer securities were not tax deductible and gains
were taxed as ordinary income, not as capital gains. I.R.C. §§ 165(j), 1287(d) (1954).
274. Goldman, Sachs & Co., supra note 241, at 76,714.
275. Electrocomponents PLC, SEC No-Action Letter, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 177,333, at 78,258 (Aug. 23, 1982), shows to what extent the
Commission will bend SEC rules so that an issuer may avoid registration. A British
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mission was less concerned about protection than it might have been if
the securities had been marketed to individual investors. If this is the
case, then Release 33-4708 may be reduced to the role of protecting only
small private investors.27 6
Interestingly enough, one no-action request had several parallels with
the CREF-France Letters and the SEC granted a no-action letter, but
without obvious reliance on Release 33-4708. Republic Resource and
Development Corp. concerned a Philippine company that planned a concurrent public offering in its home country along with a private stock
offering in the United States. 2 " A complication arose, however, because
Republic issued stocks publicly in 1959 in the Philippines and American
investors had been among the initial participants in the offering. 78 Furthermore, the issuer had not been able to actively monitor United States
trading in the previously issued shares.27 The applicant contended that
despite the fact that these American shareholders had pre-emptory
rights, registration would not be required since any concurrent private
offering to Americans would not be integrated with the public offering.2"' The SEC granted an exemption, noting the small percentage of

corporation publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange, sought to acquire the shares
of an American company, MESA, through a "vendor placement." Id. at 78,259. Under
this technique, Electrocomponents would swap the American company's stock from its
shareholders, in exchange for Electrocomponents stock. In turn, institutional investors in
the United Kingdom would purchase the Electrocomponents stock with cash. Id. The
SEC accepted the applicant's contention that this arrangement contractually mandated
that the American shareholders sell the Electrocomponents stock and that the institutional investors purchase it. Id. Therefore, despite the monetary purchase-and-sale between Electrocomponents and MESA shareholders, the Commission found that the securities did not have to be registered. See also U.K. Firm May Issue Stock to United
States Citizens Without Registration, 13 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1731 (Oct. 8,
1982).
276. Regulation D does provide exemptions for offerings that encompass a limited
number of sophisticated investors. In addition, foreign purchasers are not counted as
investors for purposes of the regulation. See supra notes 189-96. Yet in situations in
which a large number of United States institutional investors wish to purchase foreign
securities, the limit still applies on the amount of investors rules 504 through 506 allow
under a registration exemption. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.506 (1988). By
giving greater flexibility to institutional investors, as the Commission appears to have
done with the CREF-France letters, the SEC can still provide protection to small investors while according greater latitude for more knowledgeable institutional investors..
277. Republic Resource and Development Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 2,
1972) (letter of applicant Aug. 16, 1971).
278. Id. (letter of applicant Aug. 16, 1971 at 2).
279. Id.
280. Id. (letter of applicant Aug. 16, 1971 at 3-4).
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American stockholders in the company and the time lapse between the
request for the no-action letter and the original public offering.2 "
The SEC's decision in Republic bears interesting similarities to the
no-action answer in CREF. Both applicants relied on Release 33-4708
as the basis for obtaining an exemption to registration. Republic argued
that the Release did not directly apply to its situation since Release 334708 dealt with foreign offerings by domestic issuers. The firm did admit
the Release was applicable by analogy.28 2 CREF's request letters also
283
stated that Release 33-4708 was not on point with CREF's situation.
Both the CREF-France and the Republic applications emphasized that
resales of their stocks were unlikely and both applied principal antiflowback procedures. Republic's anti-flowback measure was more direct:
registration with the SEC.
Another surprising aspect of Republic that parallels CREF is that the
SEC in both instances relied on measures that the Commission could not
directly enforce against the applicants in case a violation occurred. In
CREF, the SEC relied on French law and Euromarket procedures to
stem resales.'" In Republic, the Commission apparently believed that
because American holders of the 1959 stock issue were few in number,
and that because any previous resales occurred outside the United
States,28 5 the likelihood of fraudulent resales was nonexistent.
After reviewing the short history of the relationship between Release
33-4708 and SEC no-action letters on foreign offerings, one could conclude that the SEC has merely adopted a flexible position regarding international placements; and that in keeping with the liberalization of the
times, the scope of Release 33-4708 should be more inclusive. The SEC
could be basing its decisions on the facts of the individual cases before it.
Yet a pattern behind such SEC decisions has been emerging. Future applicants for no-action letters may be successful in obtaining an exemption if the company submits to SEC registration on other aspects of the
distribution,2 86 or if a creative interpretation of Release 33-4708 can be
found.2""

281. Id. (SEC reply).
282. Id. (letter of applicant Aug. 16, 1971 at 3-4).
283. CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,363.
284. See id.
285. See Republic Resource and Development Corp., supra note 277 (letter of applicant Aug. 16, 1971 at 2-3).
286. See, e.g., id. (letter of applicant Aug. 16, 1971 at 2).
287. See generally CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,361; France Letter, supra note 10,
at 77,434.
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EFFECT OF THE SEC APPROVAL ON EXTRATERRITORIAL
SECURITIES LAW ENFORCEMENT

The SEC response in the CREF-France Letters could bring many
benefits to American and foreign issuers by simplifying compliance with
Commission rules. The decision could also allow more creative means of
financing for companies with particular capital needs who still wish to
take advantage of capital opportunities in American markets. Even with
SEC approval of distribution plans that might not have met earlier
Commission requirements, the market could remain unaffected despite a
greater theoretical danger of fraudulent conduct by foreign issuers. Yet,
the greatest impact the SEC decision will have on the common investor
is in the area of enforcement. As a result of loosened SEC attitudes on
integration and resales, American investors could be damaged by issuers
who use recently approved financial schemes to an unfair advantage.
One important question remains: as a result of changes in the SEC's
interpretation of the securities laws, will investors have protection or legal recourse if foreign distributions are fraudulently conducted? It could
be that SEC approval will effectively estop prosecutions for international
stock placement irregularities. The problem of jurisdiction, therefore, assumes greater importance. If the United States cannot establish jurisdiction over a defendant, potential fraud may go unpunished.2 8 8 This jurisdictional problem has special relevance in the CREF-France Letters
since the SEC, by granting a registration exemption, may have precluded
itself from exercising jurisdiction. After allaying the French Government
fears of SEC interference in the privatizations. 8 and by relying on
French assurances based on OPV procedures,29 0 the SEC may find it
difficult to prosecute a defendant in connection with a scheme for which
the SEC gave prior approval.2 9

288. A number of articles have analyzed the problems of extraterritorial jurisdiction
in United States securities law enforcement. E.g., Hacker & Rotunda, The Extraterritorial Regulation of Foreign Business Under the United States Securities Laws, 59
N.C.L. REv. 643 (1981); Larose, supra note 118; Moessle, The Basic Structure of

United States Securities Law Enforcement in InternationalCases, 16 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 1 (1986); Morgenstern, ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Securities
Laws: A Matrix Analysis, 7 HASTNGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1 (1983); Thomas,
supra note 2.
289. Cf CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,362.
290. France Letter, supra note 10, at 77,435.
291. Again it should be noted that no-action letters do not have the force of law and,
although it rarely occurs, courts may disregard them in determining the validity of an
issuer's act. See Lemke, supra note 85, at 1042-43; see also supra text accompanying
note 85.
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A few basic guidelines exist on the question of whether United States
law does in fact apply to conduct which has as its basis issues of foreign
securities, foreign issuers or foreign governmental responsibility. Under
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, the state has jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law for acts that produce substantial effects
within the territory, despite the fact that the main action occurred
abroad.2" 2 Additional factors that determine whether United States jurisdiction applies in securities activities include the nationality and residence of the parties.29 3 The residence and nationality factors may seem
similar, but French law allows a resident of two years (though carrying
other citizenship, even United States) to purchase French stocks. 2 "
Rules for foreign plaintiffs tend to be more stringent under United States
laws: the direct cause of the loss must have occurred in the United States
or had effects in the country.2 95
As examined earlier, the "conduct" and the "effects" tests comprise
the two standards for determining whether United States jurisdiction exists over an international securities transaction.2 96 Examination of the
effect of the CREF-France Letters on the continued applicability of either test is important since jurisdictional barriers have served as the primary obstacle against a more stringent application of United States securities laws.
A recent application of the conduct test indicates that the CREFFrance Letters may have no effect on jurisdictional barriers. In

292.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 402(1)(c) (1986)

[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].

293. RESTATEMENT § 402 comment (e) (1986). Section 402 of the Restatement analyzes jurisdictional questions by focusing on territoriality or nationality. Id. at § 402.
Any possible finding of jurisdiciton, however, is tempered by the "reasonableness" test of
§ 403: jurisdiction ensues only in situations in which reasonable factors exist to support
the exercise of jurisdiction. Id. at § 403 (1986). Cf. Larose, supra note 118, at 108-12
(analysis of jurisdiction under proposed revisions to the former Restatement, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1962)). Section 416 of the Restatement
specifically governs jurisdictional questions on securities activities. RESTATEMENT § 416
(1986). The section generally prescribes jurisdiction over such activities if the securities
transaction occurred in the United States, if a party to the activity is a United States
citizen or if the conduct had, or was intended to have, a substantial effect in the United
States. Id.
294. See supra note 115.
295. See Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d
409, 420 (8th Cir. 1979).
296. Supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text. See also Hacker & Rotunda,
supra note 288, at 648-56; see generally Larose, supra note 118.
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Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz,2 97 a Swiss citizen fraudulently attempted to
sell to a German corporation that a Mexican company held by a trust in
the Bahamas. The Swiss defendant was a beneficiary of the trust. After
several negotiation sessions in the United States, at which the defendants
stated they had authority to sell the firm, the deal fell through when the
Bahamian trustees rejected the sale. In reversing the district court's dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds,2 98 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted the test of Continental Grain
(Australia)Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds Inc.,299 holding that the misrepresentations by the defendants were "significant with respect to the alleged violation[s]" 30 0 of United States law. The important facet of
Grunenthal is that the court focused on policy aspects in applying jurisdiction. Despite the nonexistence of United States investor participation
in the underlying transaction, the court found the the United States
properly served national interests by avoiding becoming a haven for
questionable securities transactions that otherwise would be illegal if
United States citizens were involved.
Courts applying the conduct test in an action involving an SEC exemption similar to the one CREF gained, could still find jurisdiction
notwithstanding the SEC's earlier approval.30 1 This could be done only
by separating the fraudulent conduct from the actual grant of the exemption itself. As long as the conduct occurred in the United States, United
States courts would have power to overrule the SEC decision and assert
jurisdiction. The key, however, is that the conduct must have been in the
United States-if the acts transpired outside the country, a court will not
assert jurisdiction.30 2
Although the SEC decision on the CREF-France Letters would have
no effect on the conduct test, courts rarely use this yardstick. Courts have
applied more extensively the "effects" test which holds that fraudulent
activity on international capital markets must have an effect on the

297. 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983).
298. 511 F. Supp. 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
299. 592 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1979).
300. Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 424 (quoting Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 420);
see also Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 288, at 652-54 (despite limited presence of
American parties to the transaction, courts find jurisdiction in order to prevent the
United States from becoming a haven for illegal securities transactions solely involving
foreign parties).
301. See Lemke, supra note 85, at 1042.
302. Cf Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334
(2d Cir. 1972); compare id. with Mormels v. Girofinance, S.A., 544 F. Supp. 815, 81718 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also Larose, supra note 118, at 127-29.
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United States market of domestic investors. In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of American stockholders who were induced to purchase overvalued stocks of a Canadian
company based on an inaccurate prospectus. 3 ' The court held that although no significant preparatory acts occurred in the United States, the
effects on such a large group of stockholders could in theory, be the basis
for jurisdiction.'" Under the CREF proposal, the use of the resale provisions could be an effective bar against claims under an effects approach, especially if stock ownership changes were carried out through
normal French transaction procedures. Since the SEC based its approval
of the privatization requests on the belief that the stocks would come to
rest abroad,30 5 the SEC may be estopped from arguing that the "effects"
of the transaction harmed the United States market.3 08 Private causes of
action also would face the obstacle of proving that the alleged violation
constituted fraud given that the SEC gave prior approval to the issuer's
07
proposed placement.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The number and scope of exemptions to registration of foreign issued
securities has grown since the SEC began reviewing requests for noaction letters on international securities offerings. With the Commission's decisions on the CREF-France Letters, the SEC has proceeded a
step further in allowing major players in international capital markets to
avoid unnecessary registration requirements. If the present trends in this
area continue, both United States and foreign issuers will have greater
access to capital, thus building up the strengths of national economies.
Even if one assumes that the basic United States tenets of international
securities regulation, such as Release 33-4708, have been twisted to meet
the needs of issuers, such a result is just a technical aberration. The
needs of the global financial community outweigh the need for a picayune interpretation of business laws.
303. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
304. 519 F.2d at 987.
305. CREF I, supra note 10, at 77,363.
306. Some scholars have argued that federal courts do not exclusively apply either a
conduct test or an effects test: courts usually determine jurisdiction by comparing the
facts against facets of both tests, or by singling out a few salient facts of the case. Larose,
supra note 118, at 131-35; see, e.g., IT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); IIT
v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon)
S.A.L., 547 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ill. 1982) affd 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984).
307. See supra notes 76, 291.
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Valid arguments exist to support the loosening of the integration doctrine and of the resale restrictions. First, given the paucity of fraudulent
conduct in international securities sales, no explicit need exists for strict
regulation, at least until transnational securities fraud becomes a major
problem.30 8 Second, the SEC's attitude towards registration of foreign
issued securities only reflects the realities of the marketplace: because
international capital transfers have grown in importance, the SEC risks
shutting the United States off from lucrative markets if the Commission
does not adopt more flexible guidelines.80 9 Third, United States business
interests will be at a disadvantage in reaching foreign capital markets if
the United States does not place trust in the ability of foreign governments to police securities fraud in their own nations. 1 ' The decision of
the Commission regarding the CREF-France requests has helped expand the potential of international securities placements and will lead to
innovative and efficient securities placement planning.
Mitigating factors against this reading of the SEC's decision center
around the SEC's departure from maintaining a reliable and conservative interpretation of securities laws. By convoluting the meaning of Release 33-4708, and by adhering to a relaxed interpretation of what constitutes integration and impermissible resales, the Commission appears to
be acting inconsistently. An important aspect of continued liberal interpretation of registration requirements is that securities planners are still
uncertain as to what actions are acceptable to the Commission.3 1 In addition, in the rush to please large, sophisticated investment groups, the
Commission may be forgetting the needs of the average investor. By
sanctioning the French Government's proposals on the offering of privatized stock, the SEC may be delegating too much power to groups over
which the Commission has no control. This factor, in conjunction with
the mixed judicial interpretation of the extraterritorial effect of United
States securities laws, 312 may leave some investors unprotected

if

problems arise from loosely regulated international stock issues.

308. This is evidenced by the declining number of resale and integration precautions
proposed by no-action letter applicants in their clearance requests. Compare CREF I,
supra note 10, at 77,363 with Goldman, Sachs & Co., supra note 241, at 76,712.
309. See CREF II, supra note 10, at 77,613. CREF claimed it sustained a loss of at
least $10 million of potential revenue because United States restrictions made foreign
issuers wary of including United States investors in stock warrant plans. Id.
310. See generally, Begin, A Proposed Blueprintfor Achieving Cooperation in Policing Transborder Securities Fraud, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 65 (1986) (urging United

States cooperation within multilateral framework to solve fraud problems).
311.

See, e.g, CREF II, supra note 10.

312. See supra notes 124-30, 296-306 and accompanying text.
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A third interpretation of the SEC's response could be that the Commission is planning to eventually move to a two-tiered system of protection and regulation. Under this system issuers must meet strict requirements if the offerees are average investors; if the proposed purchasers are
institutional investors less regulation is needed. Seen in this light, the
Commission's decision reflects just a small but important step in achieving a two-tiered regulation system. A foundation for this system has already been established through regulation D, with its limits and exceptions based, in part, on the sophistication of the offerees. 1 3 Additionally,
there are other proposals that would accord institutional investors less
protection and less regulation in the area of international placements. 3 14
This two-tiered system perhaps will and should be the goal of the Commission, 1 ' but even if the SEC had this in mind when it granted the noaction letters to CREF and the French Government, the above rationale
still does not explain why the Commission failed to focus on the potential problems in resales that the CREF-France proposals may foster.
The decision of the Commission in the CREF-France Letters reflects
the continued liberalization of the international securities markets. The
effects of the decision will not fully be felt on the market for some time,
but for now the SEC's response will serve as a symbol and a cornerstone
for further steps in the coordination of international capital offerings.
John T. Vogel

313. See supra notes 189, 192-96.
314. See, e.g. Amex Proposal Would Create Marketfor InstitutionalForeign Stock
Trading, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 6 (Jan. 8, 1988). (American Stock Exchange
seeks SEC approval for new market allowing trading in unregistered shares by institutional investors).
315. Some securities industry leaders have urged the SEC to adopt restrictive foreign
registration guidelines, with differing protection accorded to issues depending on whether
they are targeted to sophisticated or to average investors. SEC Staff to Work on Developing Safe HarborRulefor Foreign Offerings, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1444 (Sept.
25, 1987).
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